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INTRODUCTION
The vast majority of attorneys in this country are required to complete 10
to 15 hours of continuing legal education (“CLE”) every year, an experience
well summarized by one attendee’s observation that “[k]nowledge is good,
but coerced seat time is wasteful [and] insulting.”1 The primary rationale
for mandatory CLE is to help ensure competent client representation, but
the mandatory system fails to achieve that goal. Instead, mandatory CLE
has become a self-perpetuating industry that earns hundreds of millions of
tuition dollars for course purveyors but demonstrates little, if any,
connection to better serving the public.
By contrast, almost no attorney is required to complete a single hour
of pro bono service. Although the American Bar Association (“ABA”)
recognizes the “critical” need for free legal services for “persons of limited
means,” attorneys simply are encouraged to volunteer their time.2 This
voluntary pro bono system has proven to be so woefully inadequate that
Justice Sonia Sotomayor recently declared her support for a “forced labor”
approach to attorneys’ pro bono responsibilities.3
Responding to this critical need, a current trend in the profession focuses
on requiring pro bono service from law students and bar applicants—easy
marks with little ability to protest.4 This effort, however, sidesteps the harder
1. James C. Mitchell, MCLE—The Joke’s On Us, 36 ARIZ. ATT’Y, Aug.–
Sept. 1999, at 27. Similar sentiments abound in the literature. See, e.g., Paul-Noel
Chretien, The Bar’s Back-to-School Scam, WALL ST. J., Jan. 17, 1996, at A15
(describing bar member opposition to mandatory CLE in the District of
Columbia); Walter C. Davison, David C. Farmer & Elizabeth A. Kane, Taking the
“M” out of MCLE, HAW. B.J., Aug. 2008, at 9 (describing opposition in Hawaii).
2. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 6.1 & cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N
2016) [hereinafter MODEL RULES].
3. See Tony Mauro, Sotomayor Pushes Mandatory Pro Bono, NAT’L L.J.,
May 23, 2016, at 17.
4. See Tom Lininger, Deregulating Public Interest Law, 88 TULANE L. REV.
727, 738–39 (2014) (describing “shifted” focus of pro bono reform efforts to law
students and bar applicants).
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question of mandatory pro bono for licensed attorneys, including the law
professors who may be an aspiring attorney’s first professional role models.
More than a decade ago, Dean Erwin Chemerinsky argued in favor of
mandatory pro bono service for law faculty, hoping to “at least induce
debate and force examination of how to better engage law professors in
using their talents to help those who need it.”5 That debate has yet to
materialize. Law professors have at least as much of an obligation as other
attorneys to provide pro bono service, but their resistance to doing so has
resulted in rates of participation that Professor Deborah Rhode has
described as “shameful.”6
This Article argues that the time is ripe to upend the status quo—to
eliminate mandatory CLE and to explore replacing mandatory CLE hours
with required pro bono service hours. Part I documents the enormous reach
and substantial cost of mandatory CLE—all without any evidence of
efficacy. Part II establishes that regulations protecting the legal profession
both substantially contribute to the vast need for free legal representation
and justify a pro bono requirement for attorneys. Part III explores obstacles
to eliminating mandatory CLE and requiring pro bono, including political
opposition and the absence of mandatory pro bono models. Part IV
responds to this problem with a proposal: encouraging law faculties to
impose pro bono requirements on themselves with the incentive of
eliminating their mandatory CLE obligations. This faculty test case model
offers enormous potential benefits for the indigent clients who would be
served, the law students who would find role models for a lifetime of
service, the professors whose teaching and scholarship would be enriched,
and the profession, which would gain much-needed experience with
various approaches to mandatory pro bono.

5. Erwin Chemerinsky, A Pro Bono Requirement for Faculty Members, 37
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1235, 1236 (2004). Chemerinsky, recently named Dean of
Berkeley Law, is “widely considered to be a giant in legal education.” Austin
Weinstein, Erwin Chemerinsky Named Berkeley Law Dean, DAILY CALIFORNIAN
(May 17, 2017), http://www.dailycal.org/2017/05/17/erwin-chemerinsky-namedberkeley-law-dean/ [https://perma.cc/3S2K-76MJ].
6. Deborah L. Rhode, Legal Ethics in Legal Education, 16 CLINICAL L. REV.
43, 54 (2009). Rhode, a Stanford Law School professor, has been described as
“the nation’s foremost expert on lawyers’ ethical duty to perform pro bono
service.” Tom Lininger, From Park Place to Community Chest: Rethinking
Lawyers’ Monopoly, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1343, 1343 (2007) (reviewing DEBORAH
L. RHODE, PRO BONO IN PRINCIPLE AND IN PRACTICE: PUBLIC SERVICE AND THE
PROFESSIONS (2005)).
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I. STATUS QUO: MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION
In the 1960s and 1970s, the organized bar promoted mandatory CLE
as an answer to the concern that the rising number of new attorneys had
led to a decrease in the quality of lawyering, a sentiment famously
expressed by Chief Justice Warren Burger in his comments concerning the
“inadequacies” of courtroom counsel.7 Mandatory CLE remains firmly
entrenched in the legal profession, bringing a substantial windfall for the
institutional interests that profit from the system but little, if any,
demonstrable public benefit.
A. Rationale, Rules, and Numbers
The primary rationale for mandatory CLE hinges on the alleged value
of these programs in helping to ensure attorney competence.8 To be sure,
attorneys reap other benefits from CLE classes, such as opportunities for
intellectual growth and professional advancement, but attorneys can make
individual decisions as to whether personal benefits of this sort are worth
the time and expense involved.9 These personal benefits do not justify a
mandatory scheme.
7. See Warren E. Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy: Are Specialized
Training and Certification of Advocates Essential to Our System of Justice?, 42
FORDHAM L. REV. 227, 238 (1973); see also Cheri A. Harris, MCLE: The Perils,
Pitfalls, and Promise of Regulation, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 359, 361 (2006); Deborah
L. Rhode & Lucy Buford Ricca, Revisiting MCLE: Is Compulsory Passive
Learning Building Better Lawyers?, 22 PROF. LAW. 2, 3 (2014).
8. “Competence” in this context broadly refers to the “legal knowledge, skill,
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary” for client representation.
MODEL RULES r. 1.1. All American jurisdictions require “competence” as a matter
of professional conduct, and most put the “competence” rule before all others. Links
to each jurisdiction’s rules of professional conduct, including each jurisdiction’s
version of Model Rule 1.1, are collected at Links of Interest, AM. BAR ASS’N.,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/resources/links_of
_interest.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2017) [https://perma.cc/7DFE-TKZU].
9. For example, attorneys can expand their professional prospects by taking
courses in potential new areas of practice and making new contacts at in-person
trainings. The opportunity to make professional contacts is a particular marketing
focus for organizations peddling extended CLE offerings in relaxed vacation
settings. See generally Robert J. Derocher, Combining Learning and
Entertainment: The New CLE?, BAR LEADER, May–June 2004, at 21. One CLE
purveyor, for example, assembles a mutually beneficial combination of doctors,
dentists, and attorneys through “Medical-Dental-Legal Update” courses offered
“away from the distractions and tumult of your practice” in “34 premier destination
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Improved attorney competence could justify a mandatory scheme if
mandatory CLE actually resulted in better representation for clients.10
Leaving competence to an individual attorney’s discretion is problematic
because incompetent attorneys may be unlikely to seek out training or even
realize that they need it.11 Leaving competence to market forces also is
problematic because most clients cannot easily discern attorney
incompetence.12
The organized bar has assumed responsibility for maintaining professionwide competence. The bar’s efforts in this regard begin with entry-to-practice
hurdles: graduation from an accredited law school; passing the bar exam; and
satisfying character and fitness requirements. At the other end of the
professional continuum is the disciplinary process, which retroactively
assesses and punishes alleged incompetence in particular cases.13 Bridging
the gap is CLE, which is designed to help new attorneys gain full
competence as well as maintain and sharpen competence throughout
attorneys’ careers.14
resorts.” See About AEI, AM. EDUC. INST., https://www.aeiseminars.com/aboutaei/about-aei/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2017) [https://perma.cc/TVN3-NJE5].
10. See, e.g., Joseph Faulhaber, Mandatory Continuing Legal Education:
For, ALASKA B. RAG, Mar.–Apr. 1998, at 14 (arguing that “the burden of
protecting those whom [the legal] profession serves” justifies mandatory CLE);
Mary Frances Edwards, Mandatory CLE: Shield or Sham?, 3 J. PROF. LEGAL
EDUC. 27, 30–31 (1985); Jordan W. Lorence, Alan E. Sears & Benjamin W. Bull,
No Official High or Petty: The Unnecessary, Unwise, And Unconstitutional Trend
of Prescribing Viewpoint Orthodoxy in Mandatory Continuing Legal Education,
44 S. TEX. L. REV. 263, 270–72 (2002); Alan Ogden, Mandatory Continuing
Legal Education: A Study of Its Effects, 3 J. PROF. LEGAL EDUC. 3, 4 (1985–1986);
Andrew M. Perlman, A Behavioral Theory of Legal Ethics, 90 IND. L.J. 1639,
1666–67 (2015); Colleen G. Segall, Ethics in Mandatory CLE: An Overlooked
Means for Improving the Standard of the Profession, 6 J. PROF. LEGAL EDUC. 22,
25 (1988).
11. See Randall T. Shepard, The “L” In “CLE” Stands For “Legal”, 40
VAL. U. L. REV. 311, 317–18 (2006) (“We cannot assume that . . . the attorney will
be able to recognize his own lack of competence.”).
12. See, e.g., Soha Turfler, A Model Definition of the Practice of Law: If Not
Now, When? An Alternative Approach To Defining the Practice of Law, 61 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 1903, 1919–20 (2004) (explaining the “information asymmetry”
that leaves clients “unable to evaluate the quality” of their attorney’s services).
13. See, e.g., William E. Hornsby, Jr., Ad Rules Infinitum: The Need for
Alternatives to State-Based Ethics Governing Legal Services Marketing, 36 U.
RICHMOND L. REV. 49, 54 (2002); Anthony J. Luppino, Multidisciplinary
Business Planning Firms: Expanding the Regulatory Tent Without Creating a
Circus, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 109, 146 (2004).
14. See Shepard, supra note 11, at 324.
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Rules of professional conduct reflect the bar’s oversight and instruct
attorneys to maintain competence, in part, through compliance with “all
continuing legal education requirements to which the lawyer is subject.”15
Minnesota and Iowa adopted the first mandatory CLE measures in 1975;16
now, 46 states impose mandatory CLE requirements.17 Almost all mandatory
CLE jurisdictions require an average of between 10 and 15 CLE hours per
year.18
No publicly available source quantifies the number of attorneys
nationally who are subject to mandatory CLE. The ABA collects data on the
total number of active attorneys by state,19 but each mandatory CLE
jurisdiction exempts different groups of attorneys from the requirement. Such
exemptions commonly include attorneys on active military duty, federal and
state judges, various elected officials, and attorneys of retirement age.20 No
15. MODEL RULES r. 1.1 cmt. 8. Furthermore, the ABA has adopted a separate
“Model Rule for Minimum Continuing Legal Education,” providing model
guidance to the states regarding the particulars of mandatory CLE programs. See
MODEL RULE FOR MINIMUM CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION (AM. BAR ASS’N
2017), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/images/abanews/2017%20
Midyear%20Meeting%20Resolutions/106.pdf [https://perma.cc/PMJ6-8TFN].
16. See Rocio T. Aliaga, Framing the Debate On Mandatory Continuing
Legal Education (MCLE): The District of Columbia Bar’s Consideration of
MCLE, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1145, 1150–51 (1995).
17. Links to each jurisdiction’s mandatory CLE rules are available at MCLE
Information by Jurisdiction, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/cle
/mandatory_cle/mcle_states.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2017) [https://perma.cc
/S7AQ-RV5U]. The District of Columbia, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
and South Dakota generally do not require CLE credits, although the District of
Columbia and Massachusetts do require newly admitted attorneys to take specific
courses on local practice and professional responsibility. See R. GOVERNING THE
D.C. BAR II § 3; MASS. ANN. R. OF THE SUPREME JUD. CT. 3:16. Michigan
rescinded a new-attorney CLE requirement in 1994. See infra notes 160–164 and
accompanying text.
18. Some states spread the requirement over two or three years. See, e.g., SUP.
CT. R. FOR THE GOV’T OF THE BAR OF OHIO R. X § 3 (requiring 24 CLE hours
over two years); COLO. R. CIV. P. 260.2 (requiring 45 CLE hours over three years).
Only two mandatory CLE states require fewer than ten hours per year. See
ALASKA BAR R. 65(a) (requiring three hours per year); R. OF THE SUP. CT. OF
HAW. 22(a) (same).
19. See ABA National Lawyer Population Survey, AM. BAR ASS’N (2016),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/market_research/national
-lawyer-population-by-state-2016.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/VJJ9-7QTA].
20. The exemptions allowed by each jurisdiction can be found in that
jurisdiction’s mandatory CLE rules. See MCLE Information by Jurisdiction,
supra note 17. By way of example, see CONN. SUPER. CT. R. § 2-27A(a)(3).
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source, however, delineates by state the number of attorneys in the various
exempted groups.
Projecting from the best data available, approximately 950,000 attorneys
will fulfill approximately 11.5 million mandatory CLE hours in 2017. The
950,000 attorneys figure represents 83% of the number of active attorneys in
each of the 46 mandatory CLE jurisdictions, with 83% approximating the
number of attorneys who are not exempt from the requirement.21 The 11.5
million hours figure represents the number of non-exempt attorneys in each
state multiplied by the number of CLE hours required by that state.22 These
figures probably undercount both the number of attorneys and the number of
hours;23 even so, the figures demonstrate the enormity of the undertaking that
mandatory CLE has become.
B. Mandatory CLE Does Not Improve Attorney Competence
Do these 11.5 million hours render 950,000 attorneys more competent
than their counterparts in non-mandatory CLE states? If the relevant measure
21. Attorneys in private practice and in private industry together comprise
83% of United States attorneys. See Lawyer Demographics, AM. BAR ASS’N
(2016), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/market_re
search/lawyer-demographics-tables-2016.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z
H4N-29JS]. Although these percentages are from 2005, they are the most recent
figures available from the ABA. The author chose 83% for these calculations
because attorneys in these two categories are unlikely to be exempt from CLE
requirements. The ABA’s 2016 data lists 1,142,906 active attorneys in the 46
mandatory CLE jurisdictions, ABA National Lawyer Population Survey, supra
note 19; 83% of that number is 948,612. Calculations on file with author.
22. For example, the ABA reported that Alabama had 14,466 active attorneys
in 2016. 83% of that number is 12,173 attorneys. Alabama requires 12 CLE hours
per year, which—multiplied by 12,173—results in 146,073 mandatory CLE hours
for Alabama. This process was repeated for each mandatory CLE jurisdiction. The
mandatory CLE hours per state were added together for a total of 11,497,530
hours. Calculations on file with author.
23. For example, although these calculations include only “private practice”
and “private industry” attorneys, see supra note 21, many government and other
attorneys working outside of these sectors are subject to mandatory CLE
requirements. See, e.g., ARK. JUDICIARY R. FOR MINIMUM CONTINUING LEGAL
EDUC. 2 (exempting only senior and inactive attorneys from mandatory CLE
requirements). Moreover, the calculations here do not include the higher hourly
requirements that may be imposed on particular groups of attorneys, such as
newly admitted attorneys in certain states. See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. &
REGS. tit. 22, §§ 1500.12(a), 1500.22 (requiring 16 hours for newly admitted
attorneys “in each of the first two years of admission to the Bar” as opposed to
the 24 hours per two years required for other attorneys).
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is merely CLE attendance, then the answer is “yes.” Attorneys, like other
professionals, avoid time-consuming and expensive activities like CLE unless
attendance is required.24 Not surprisingly, the literature readily documents a
sharp increase in attendance once a jurisdiction changes from voluntary to
mandatory CLE attendance.25
Attendance as the measure of success, however, assumes that competence—
the rationale for mandatory CLE—actually is enhanced by attending CLE
courses.26 With competence itself as the appropriate measure, the attorneys in
mandatory CLE states appear to lack any advantage over their counterparts in
non-mandatory states. As discussed below, no data supports the conclusion
that mandatory CLE has any positive effect on attorney competence.
Moreover, this lack of supportive data is consistent with what adult learning
theory would predict: the structure of CLE courses and the mandatory system
itself discourage substantial or lasting results.
1. No Data Despite Opportunity and Incentive
The 46 states that have adopted mandatory CLE measures since 1975
provide a ready-made source of empirical data to test the proposition that
attorneys in these states have a competence advantage over attorneys in nonmandatory states. In 1997, Professor Colleen Graffy found “no statistics
indicating a reduction in complaints, disciplinary measures or malpractice
insurance premiums since [mandatory CLE’s] implementation,”27 and none
have materialized since.28
24. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 7, at 370 (“One reason mandatory education
is effective is because it reaches the significant number of people who do not take
courses unless required.”); Rhode & Ricca, supra note 7, at 7.
25. See, e.g., Kimberlee K. Kovach, Lawyer Ethics Must Keep Pace with
Practice: Plurality in Lawyering Roles Demands Diverse and Innovative Ethical
Standards, 39 IDAHO L. REV. 399, 416–17 (2003); Ogden, supra note 10, at 10–11.
26. See, e.g., Martin P. Moltz, Viewpoint: Debate Over MCLE Continues:
Mandatory CLE—A Better Idea Now Than Ever Before, 11 CBA REC. 44, 44
(1997) (“Sadly, only the spectre of mandatory CLE will likely result in the
desirable goal of having every lawyer ‘keep up with the law’ in their respective
fields.”).
27. Colleen Graffy, Mandatory Continuing Legal Education, 147 NEW L.J.
1650, 1651 (1997). Earlier writers similarly observed the lack of data supporting
a link between mandatory CLE and competence. See Aliaga, supra note 16, at
1164; David A. Thomas, Why Mandatory CLE Is a Mistake, 6 UTAH B.J., Jan.
1993, at 14, 14.
28. See, e.g., Davison, Farmer & Kane, supra note 1, at 9; Donald S. Murphy
& Thomas Schwen, The Future: Transitioning from Training Lawyers to Improving
Their Performance, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 521, 521 (2006); Rhode & Ricca, supra
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Some mandatory CLE proponents acknowledge the absence of empirical
data but respond that no data disprove mandatory CLE’s impact on competence
either.29 This argument has an appealing even-handedness, but it is a superficial
appeal. The fight between opponents and supporters of mandatory CLE occurs
on a vastly unequal playing field, and the burden of proving the mandatory
system’s connection to competence should fall squarely on the latter group’s
shoulders.30
Opposition to mandatory CLE comes primarily from individual attorneys,
with some attorneys far more negatively impacted by the requirement than
others. Many larger firms provide in-house CLE courses, cover their attorneys’
CLE tuition costs, or at least provide salaries generous enough for their
attorneys to cover CLE costs themselves with little trouble.31 Solo practitioners
and others who work in smaller or less profitable offices, however, have little
capacity to absorb the loss of hours and dollars that mandatory CLE
demands.32
Proponents of mandatory CLE, on the other hand, include a broad range
of organized interests with substantial resources to assess the mandatory

note 7, at 8. See generally Holly B. Fisher & W. Franklin Spikes, Examining the
Relationship Between Learning, Continuing Legal Education, and the
Improvement of the Practice of Law, in TRAINING INITIATIVES AND STRATEGIES
FOR THE MODERN WORKFORCE (Scott Frasard & Frederick Carl Prasuhn eds.,
2017) (discussing the need for better data).
29. See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 10, at 31; Neil Gold, Beyond Competence:
The Case for Mandatory Continuing Learning in Law, 4 J. PROF. LEGAL EDUC.
17, 19 (1986).
30. See, e.g., Jack Joseph, Mandatory Continuing Legal Education—An
Opponent’s View, 75 ILL. B.J. 256, 256 (1987).
31. See, e.g., Alex Rich, 5 Super Easy Tips for Finding Cheap CLE Credits,
ABOVE THE LAW (Jan. 8, 2014, 10:12 AM), http://abovethelaw.com/2014/01/5super-easy-tips-for-finding-cheap-cle-credits/ (noting CLE costs are a common
benefit for “Biglaw” attorneys) [https://perma.cc/XSH2-EP6R].
32. See Carolyn Elefant, Why Can’t CLE Deliver Real Value to Solos By
Teaching Real Skills?, ABOVE THE LAW (Aug. 30, 2016, 6:02 PM), http://above
thelaw.com/2016/08/why-cant-cle-deliver-real-value-to-solos-by-teaching-realskills/?rf=1 (“CLE requirements disproportionately hurt solo lawyers who often
lack the money for the pricier CLEs. Moreover, some CLE programs are priced
in such a way that there’s effectively a ‘solo tax,’ since the costs can’t be spread
across multiple participants. Finally, for a true solo, time spent at CLE displaces
hours available for billing, so on top of the price tag for the program, solo
attendance at CLE also has an opportunity cost.”) [https://perma.cc/5QA9CNL9]; Faulhaber, supra note 10, at 14 (noting that mandatory CLE tends to drive
“marginal” attorneys out of business); Thomas, supra note 27, at 14 (noting
mandatory CLE’s potentially discriminatory impact on less affluent attorneys).
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system’s impact on attorney competence. Private CLE purveyors are major
players in the industry. So, too, are bar associations and law schools33—both
of which may be particularly dependent on CLE revenues as a result of the
downturn in the legal market and law school admissions.34 Various CLE trade
groups further support the industry.35
These organized interests rely on mandatory CLE to put bodies in the
chairs and tuition dollars in the bank. Course providers generally do not
make revenue data publicly available,36 and few outside observers have
attempted specific calculations.37 But, taking again the conservative
33. See, e.g., Kenneth D. Dean, Models for Organizing Law School CLE
Programs, 4 CLE J. 23, 24 (2001); Derocher, supra note 9, at 21; DEBORAH L.
RHODE, THE TROUBLE WITH LAWYERS 106 (2015).
34. See, e.g., Gregg Toppo, Why You Might Want to Think Twice Before
Going to Law School, USA TODAY (June 28, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com
/story/news/2017/06/28/law-schools-hunkering-down-enrollment-slips/4302130
01/ [https://perma.cc/C24V-2GS5].
35. Trade groups include the Continuing Legal Education Regulators
Association (“CLEreg”), composed of mandatory CLE administrators and staff,
see About Us, CLEREG, https://www.clereg.org/about (last visited Sept. 30, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/UXB4-EBJP], and the Association for Continuing Legal Education
(“ACLEA”), an international group, see About ACLEA, ASS’N FOR CONTINUING
LEGAL EDUC., http://www.aclea.org/?page=about (last visited Sept. 30, 2017) [https:
//perma.cc/WE4P-U8PR].
36. For example, the ABA and many state bar associations provide no CLE
revenue information at all. Others provide annual financial reports that include an
expansive category like “Education” that presumably includes both mandatory
CLE and other educational endeavors, though no particulars are provided. See,
e.g., N.J. STATE BAR ASS’N, 2016-2017 ANNUAL REPORT 8 (2017), https://tcms
.njsba.com/personifyebusiness/Portals/0/NJSBA-PDF/Reports%20&%20Com
ments/AR2016.pdf (reporting $6.1 million in “Education” revenue) [https://per
ma.cc/5J2J-WKAR]. Among the few bar associations providing specific
mandatory CLE course revenue figures is California. See STATE BAR OF CAL.,
2015 FINANCIAL STATEMENT AND INDEPENDENT AUDITOR’S REPORT 12, 43
(2016), http://www.calbar.ca.gov/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=JD0OoHV0qJQ%3
d&tabid=224&mid=1534 (reporting $971,849 in revenue from CLE fees)
[https://perma.cc/DFL6-SFAN].
37. See, e.g., Cost-Effective Ways to Meet CLE Requirements, WIS. L.J. (Mar.
30, 2009, 1:00 AM), http://wislawjournal.com/2009/03/30/costeffective-ways-tomeet-cle-requirements (referencing mandatory CLE’s “substantial price tag” but
providing no specific amounts) [https://perma.cc/9ZAX-F8NZ]. 20 years ago, one
critic undertook a more specific calculation, albeit with little detail regarding his
underlying data. See Chretien, supra note 1, at A15. Chretien estimated that
630,000 attorneys took an average of 12 mandatory CLE hours per year with each
hour costing a minimum of $20. See id. These 1996 figures would have totaled
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estimate of 950,000 attorneys fulfilling 11.5 million mandatory course
hours,38 mandatory CLE tuition revenue for 2017 reasonably can be
estimated at a minimum of $345 million.39 The magnitude of proponents’
financial incentive to maintain the mandatory system renders the absence
of correlative data at least suspicious.40 Were there a correlation to be
found, mandatory CLE proponents should have been able to demonstrate
by now that the system actually achieves its competence-enhancing
purposes.
To say that no data supports a correlation between mandatory CLE
and competence is no exaggeration. Many surveys assess participants’
positive and negative views about CLE programs.41 Mandatory CLE
proponents, however, point to only two sources of data as broad evidence
of a mandatory CLE-competence correlation: malpractice insurance
premiums and disciplinary actions. Neither source supports the mandatory
cause.

approximately $151 million at that time; adding in the dollar value of time lost by
participating lawyers brought Chretien’s total estimate to $360 million per year.
See id.
38. See supra notes 21–24 and accompanying text.
39. To calculate this figure, the author assumed $30 per credit hour. Thirty
dollars per credit hour is one author’s relatively recent low-end estimate of CLE
tuition costs, an estimate that excluded both free courses and the most expensive
options. See Claudine V. Pease-Wingenter, Halting the Profession’s Female
Brain Drain While Increasing the Provision of Legal Services to the Poor: A
Proposal to Revamp and Expand Emeritus Attorney Programs, 37 OKLA. CITY U.
L. REV. 433, 459 (2012) (estimating CLE tuition at $30–$50 per credit hour and
noting that most attorneys cannot fulfill all required hours through free and lowcost options).
40. The financial incentive has been present from the industry’s beginnings.
See Marvin E. Frankel, Curing Lawyers’ Incompetence: Primum Non Nocere, 10
CREIGHTON L. REV. 613, 614 (1977) (describing mandatory CLE as a “major
growth industry” shortly after mandatory CLE rules were first adopted in 1975).
41. Compare, e.g., David S. Caudill, Sympathy for the Devil?: Reflections on
the Crime-Fraud Exception to Client Confidentiality, 8 J. OF CIV. RTS. AND ECON.
DEV. 369, 371–72, 372 n.6 (1993) (describing a survey in which 89% of
respondents stated that CLE programs do not “diminish incompetent or unethical
lawyering”), with ILL. SUPREME COURT COMM’N ON PROF’LISM, 2012 LAWYER
FEEDBACK ON CLE 3 (2012) (describing survey in which 61.6% of respondents
reported participating “in a professional responsibility CLE course that resulted
in my increased knowledge or capability”). Most respondents to a recent survey
of Kansas CLE providers said that CLE was “effective” or “very effective” in
improving attorney practice, but this conclusion was based more on belief than on
measured practice improvement. See Fisher & Spikes, supra note 28, at 101–02.
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a. Malpractice Insurance
First, proponents cite the lower malpractice premiums offered in some
mandatory CLE jurisdictions as evidence of the mandatory system’s
positive impact on both competence and an attorney’s bottom line.42
According to this line of reasoning, malpractice insurers—who lack any
reason to favor mandatory CLE if it does not reduce the number of claims
and the amounts paid out—must have determined that mandatory CLE
correlates with lowered malpractice levels.43
The malpractice insurance argument is without foundation. Some
assertions of a correlation between mandatory CLE and lowered premiums
simply rely on older, unsupported statements to this effect.44 The only
substantiated claims demonstrate lowered premiums for attorneys who
voluntarily attend specific malpractice-reduction programs offered or
approved by insurers.45 In other words, the reduction does not derive from
the existence of a mandatory CLE requirement that may be satisfied
through a vast variety of courses. Indeed, Professor Mary Frances Edwards
42. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 7, at 367; Ogden, supra note 10, at 9; Chris
Ziegler & Justin Kuhn, Is MCLE a Good Thing? An Inquiry Into MCLE and
Attorney Discipline, CLEREG, at 7 & n.8, https://www.clereg.org/assets/pdf
/Is_MCLE_A_Good_Thing.pdf (last visited Sept. 8, 2017) [https://perma.cc
/Q9BH-SVWZ]. Although the Ziegler and Kuhn paper is undated, references
within the paper suggest that it was likely written in 2013.
43. See, e.g., Faulhaber, supra note 10, at 14 (arguing that mandatory CLE
adoption in Alaska will reduce premiums because mandatory CLE leads to fewer
attorney mistakes, which in turn leads to fewer malpractice claims).
44. For example, Ziegler and Kuhn argue that lower malpractice insurance
premiums in some mandatory CLE jurisdictions reflect its efficacy, but they rely
solely on Cheri Harris’s 2006 article. Ziegler & Kuhn, supra note 42, at 7 & n.48.
Harris, in turn, relies solely on Alan Ogden’s 1984 article, which itself relies
solely on a 1983 ABA report that the best efforts of the author and the Georgetown
Law Library Research Service were unable to locate. See Harris, supra note 7, at
367; Ogden, supra note 10, at 9; see also JUTTA KATH, CONTROLLING LEGAL
MALPRACTICE INSURANCE COST AND AVAILABILITY IN A CHANGING
MARKETPLACE 5 (2002) (providing no citation for a similar argument regarding
insurance premiums); TASK FORCE ON CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC., REPORT TO
THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA BAR 114–15 (Jan.
1995) (noting the absence of data establishing malpractice differentials in
mandatory versus non-mandatory CLE jurisdictions).
45. See, e.g., Fotios M. Burtzos, Mandatory CLE: Knowledge is Good, COLO.
LAW., May 2005, at 39–40, 40 n.1 (describing small premium reduction for
insureds who participate in certain CLE programs); Kevin R. Culhane & John E.
Hurley, Jr., Insurance Situation Not Quite Hopeless, RECORDER, Apr. 5, 2002, at
5 (same).
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found that not only does the data not support a correlation between
mandatory CLE and lowered malpractice claims but also that the lowered
premium rates probably were “more the result of tough negotiation by state
bar associations with their official malpractice carriers than evidence of
faith in CLE by the insurance carriers.”46
b. Disciplinary Action
The only other effort to establish a data-driven link between
mandatory CLE and improved competence is a recent paper whose title
asks, “Is [Mandatory] CLE a Good Thing?”47 This paper was published by
a mandatory CLE trade organization, and—as might be expected given the
interests of the publisher—the authors answer this question in the affirmative.48
The authors’ own data and analysis, however, belie their conclusion.
The paper describes a study testing the hypothesis that mandatory CLE
adoption improves attorney performance and that this improvement would
be reflected in lowered attorney disciplinary rates.49 The authors reviewed
disciplinary statistics in five of the six jurisdictions that implemented
mandatory CLE between 2000 and 2010.50 Looking at disciplinary data
from three years before and three years after mandatory CLE
implementation,51 the authors determined that their hypothesis was correct,
notwithstanding that most of the data pointed in the opposite direction.52
The study focused on three distinct points in the disciplinary process:
(1) disciplinary complaints filed; (2) cases docketed for further proceedings
after preliminary investigation of the complaint; and (3) findings of
misconduct.53 The authors found no statistically significant correlations for
categories (1) and (3); in other words, mandatory CLE did not decrease
46. Edwards, supra note 10, at 30–31 (relying on survey data from Colorado).
Even if evidence demonstrated lower malpractice premiums in mandatory CLE
states, various factors go into premium calculations, including law office size and
area of practice. See, e.g., Tom Baker & Rick Swedloff, Liability Insurer Data as
a Window on Lawyers’ Professional Liability, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1273, 1285
n.38 (2015). Any statistical analysis would need to account for state-by-state
variations on these metrics.
47. See Ziegler & Kuhn, supra note 42.
48. See id. at 1.
49. See id.
50. The five states studied were Alaska, Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, and New
Jersey. The sixth state, Nebraska, did not make disciplinary statistics available.
Id. at 9–10.
51. Id. at 11–12.
52. See id. at 14.
53. Id. at 10.
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complaints about attorney competence or the number of cases in which
incompetent representation was found to have actually occurred.54 Instead, the
only significant correlation was for category (2), the least relevant measure:
the number of complaints moved through the system for decision.55
These authors took on a task long sidestepped in the mandatory CLE
debate: attempting to fill in the persistent data gap. Their idea makes sense;
a statistically significant reduction in attorney discipline after mandatory
CLE adoption could indicate that mandatory CLE has a positive effect on
attorney competence. Even taking the authors’ statistical analysis at face
value, however, their affirmative conclusion leaps well ahead of their
data.56
2. Mandatory CLE Structure
Faced with the absence of data, mandatory CLE proponents appeal to
a commonsense assumption that mandatory CLE must positively impact
attorney competence.57 Even unwilling attorneys, the reasoning goes, are
bound to learn something useful from attending CLE courses. As argued
by one proponent of mandatory CLE, “Even if no statistics prove [that
mandatory] CLE improves competence, there are numerous attorneys who
54. See id. at 13.
55. See id.
56. Ironically, the absence of data demonstrating any connection between
mandatory CLE and competence also undermines clients’ ability to claim
ineffective assistance based on counsel’s failure to comply with CLE
requirements. See, e.g., People v. Ngo, 924 P.2d 97, 101–02 (Cal. 1996) (citing
lack of data in rejecting ineffective assistance claim that relied on attorney’s
failure to comply with mandatory CLE regulations); State v. Lentz, 844 So. 2d
837, 841–42 (La. 2003) (following Ngo); cf. Commonwealth v. Grant, 992 A.2d
152, 154–55, 160 & n.5 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010) (finding ineffective assistance when
attorney had drug convictions and numerous other disciplinary violations as well
as failure to complete CLE requirements).
57. See, e.g., D. Franklin Arey, III, Competent Appellate Advocacy and
Continuing Legal Education: Fitting the Means to the End, 2 J. APP. PRAC. &
PROCESS 27, 41 (2000) (“[T]his essay assumes the effectiveness of CLE programs
in improving participant competence,” notwithstanding the absence of evidence
to this effect); Edwards, supra note 10, at 30 (“[A]lthough it cannot be proved,
[mandatory] CLE probably has a positive effect on competence.”); Harris, supra
note 7, at 370–71 (“Even without statistical proof that [mandatory] CLE is
effective, many in the profession seem to take for granted that [it] is key to
maintaining attorney competence.”); Ogden, supra note 10, at 9 (acknowledging
author’s own belief that mandatory CLE positively affects competence even
though it cannot be proven by objective or scientific means).
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are sued, suspended or disbarred for incompetence or unethical behavior
in every state every year. Something must be done.”58
That “something,” however, is not mandatory CLE. The structure of
the mandatory system and of most CLE courses thwarts any positive
connection to improved competence. Proponents’ absence of correlative
data, in other words, is entirely consistent with what should be expected
from the mandatory CLE status quo.
One reality of the mandatory system that undermines a connection to
attorney competence is the fact that an attorney can satisfy CLE
requirements with courses that have little or no bearing on that attorney’s
actual law practice. For example, Alabama annually requires 12 hours of
CLE courses, which can cover any topic as long as one hour addresses
“ethics” issues.59 Thus, an Alabama divorce lawyer can fulfill her CLE
requirements through courses ranging from “Banking Law Update” to
“The Legacy of To Kill a Mockingbird” to “Law and the Imagining of
Difference”—a typical sampling of one vendor’s Alabama-approved
offerings in early 2017.60 The range of topics may be personally satisfying
for the attorney and may reduce her resentment toward the requirement.61
The vast array of courses also may allow her to pick the lowest cost or
most convenient option when the mandatory CLE certification deadline
looms. This breadth of choice, however, belies the assertion that
mandatory CLE better protects clients from incompetent representation.62
Moreover, the assumption that productive learning will occur simply
by putting CLE teachers and attendees in the same space is problematic
58. Lisa A. Grigg, Note, The Mandatory Continuing Legal Education
(MCLE) Debate: Is It Improving Lawyer Competence Or Just Busy Work?, 12
BYU J. PUB. L. 417, 427 (1998).
59. See Alabama: MCLE Requirements, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.american
bar.org/cle/mandatory_cle/mcle_states/states_a-k/alabama.html (last visited Sept.
30, 2017) [https://perma.cc/QP8C-JUNX]. Links to similar descriptions of each
state’s mandatory CLE requirements can be found at MCLE Information by
Jurisdiction, supra note 17.
60. See CLE ALABAMA (Sept. 30, 2017), http://www.clealabama.com/
[https://perma.cc/QW56-QQAL].
61. See Shepard, supra note 11, at 312.
62. See Frankel, supra note 40, at 628 (noting mandatory CLE’s “fungible”
hours requirement, “during which everybody must be educated in something, no
matter what”); Shepard, supra note 11, at 323 (arguing against mandatory CLE
credit for courses with only “indirect” benefit to clients). Allowing a wide range
of courses to meet mandatory CLE requirements may promote “good public
citizen[ship]” generally, Jay Conison, Law School Education and Liberal CLE,
40 VAL. U. L. REV. 325, 340–41 (2006), but the connection to competence is too
strained to justify a massive national CLE requirement.
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even when attendance is voluntary. Widely accepted “best practices” for
adult learning include substantial student-instructor interaction, interaction
among students, high expectations for students, prompt feedback, and active
learning rather than passive listening.63 Most CLE courses, however,
consist of nothing more than a lecture with some time set aside at the end
for the lecturer to respond to questions or comments; the session requires
no substantive preparation or follow-up and allows for little meaningful
interactivity.64 These common CLE characteristics are a model of how not
to reach adult learners and help explain why so many CLE courses leave
so little lasting impact.65
A reasonable response to the overall lack of effective course design
could be to design better courses—that is, create CLE offerings that more
thoughtfully incorporate adult learning principles. Many commentators
have proposed improvements in this regard.66 This approach, however, is
unlikely to improve substantially the overall experience of most
mandatory attendees for two reasons.
First, requiring attendance implicitly emphasizes the value of simply
showing up and “ignores contextual factors of the learning process, such

63. See, e.g., Barbara A. Bichelmeyer, Best Practices in Adult Education and
E-Learning: Leverage Points for Quality and Impact of CLE, 40 VAL. U.L. REV.
509, 515–16 (2006).
64. See, e.g., id. at 511–12; Bruce A. Green, Teaching Lawyers Ethics, 51 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 1091, 1097 (2007); Murphy & Schwen, supra note 28, at 521–22;
Segall, supra note 10, at 29.
65. See, e.g., Rhode & Ricca, supra note 7, at 8 (“Almost never do CLE
programs provide the kind of environment that experts find conducive to adult
learning, which involves preparation, participation, evaluation, accountability, and
opportunities to apply new information in a practice setting.”); T. Brettel Dawson,
Judicial Education: Pedagogy for a Change, 2015 J. DISP. RESOL. 175, 182 & n.29
(2015); Quintin Johnstone, Bar Associations: Policies and Performance, 15 YALE
L. & POL’Y REV. 193, 241 (1996). The quality of teaching provided by underpaid
CLE instructors also may interfere with effective learning. See Elefant, supra note
32 (observing that lack of instructor pay results in “less-qualified speakers eager for
‘exposure,’ or speakers who will sell their firm or their product instead of imparting
real value”).
66. See, e.g., Bichelmeyer, supra note 63, at 516–19 (suggesting that the
inherent flexibility of courses provided through various distance learning
platforms provides an opportunity to incorporate adult learning principles into
CLE course offerings); Green, supra note 64 (proposing a problem method
approach to CLE ethics offerings); Grigg, supra note 58 (proposing CLE
programs that are adaptable, interactive, use hypotheticals, and are available in
multiple settings); Harris, supra note 7, at 360 (proposing that CLE courses could
better address a variety of learning styles).
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as a person’s ability and willingness to learn.”67 Not surprisingly, then,
observations abound of inattention during mandatory CLE courses as
attendees do crossword puzzles, catch up on emails, or just sit politely
through the session, waiting to be dismissed.68
Second, courses that emphasize active learning and intensive contact
between instructor and student require a substantial investment of money
and/or time. For example, Professors Rhode and Ricca cited the original
version of a training program developed by the Indiana Public Defender
Council as a “model” of incorporating adult learning principles into
mandatory CLE offerings.69 The program extended over 16 weeks and
involved multiple meetings and intensive personal coaching on the
participant’s actual cases.70 Subsequently, however, the Indiana program,
which paid the instructors but was free to students, shrank from 16 weeks
to 4 weeks and then became defunct.71 Although participating attorneys
were enthusiastic about the experience, the multiple required meetings
proved to be a logistical challenge, and the original outside funding for the
program was not renewed.72
Some mandatory CLE proponents argue that the system will right
itself eventually; that is, the increase in attendees and oversight
infrastructure that comes with a mandatory system eventually will increase
the quality of the offerings.73 As is evident from four decades of mandatory
CLE experience, however, the system does not produce high quality
programs with lasting results. CLE courses certainly would benefit from

67. Graffy, supra note 27, at 1651; see also Green, supra note 64, at 1097;
Murphy & Schwen, supra note 28, at 524; Rhode & Ricca, supra note 7, at 8;
Thomas, supra note 27, at 14.
68. See, e.g., Graffy, supra note 27, at 1651; Mitchell, supra note 1, at 29;
John M. Murtagh, Mandatory Continuing Legal Education: Against, ALASKA B.
RAG, Mar.–Apr. 1998, at 14; Rhode & Ricca, supra note 7, at 8.
69. Rhode & Ricca, supra note 7, at 9 & n.87 (citing Murphy & Schwen,
supra note 28, at 538). The Indiana training program was entitled, “Effective
Representation of People Charged with Crimes Course.” See Murphy & Schwen,
supra note 28, at 522 n.5.
70. Murphy & Schwen, supra note 28, at 534–38.
71. Telephone Interviews with Donald Murphy, Co-developer of the Indiana
program (Jan. 24 & June 19, 2017) (notes on file with author).
72. Id. Mr. Murphy is hopeful that the four-week version of the program may
yet be revived. Id. The Indiana Public Defender Council still offers a coaching
program specifically focused on preparation for trial. Id.
73. See Rhode & Ricca, supra note 7, at 7 (describing but not endorsing this
argument).
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incorporating better models of adult learner engagement, but there is little
incentive for improvement when attendance is mandatory.74
II. STATUS QUO: VOLUNTARY PRO BONO
The 1960s and 1970s witnessed a growing awareness of the power of
the justice system to right many societal wrongs and the inability of
indigent individuals to access that system effectively.75 The ABA debated
imposing a mandatory pro bono obligation during this time but ultimately
opted for a voluntary approach, citing attorney opposition.76 The voluntary
system remains, apparently impervious to its failure to meet the everexpanding need for free legal services.
A. The Unmet Need for Legal Services
The rationale for pro bono service—whether voluntary or
mandatory—starts with need. Estimates vary as to the number of persons
who need but cannot afford legal representation—a problem commonly
referred to as “the justice gap.”77 No credible estimation, however, would
describe the gap as anything short of “vast.”78
The continuing justice gap problem is reflected in the difficult
circumstances facing the Legal Services Corporation (“LSC”), the nation’s

74. See id. at 9.
75. E.g., SHELDON KRANTZ, THE LEGAL PROFESSION: WHAT IS WRONG AND
HOW TO FIX IT 73 (2013).
76. See Scott L. Cummings, The Politics of Pro Bono, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1,
29–33 (2004) (outlining history of mandatory pro bono proposals within the
ABA); April Faith-Slaker, What We Know and Need to Know About Pro Bono
Service Delivery, 67 S.C. L. REV. 267, 280–81 (2016) (same).
77. E.g., The Unmet Need for Legal Aid, LEGAL SERVS. CORP., http://www
.lsc.gov/what-legal-aid/unmet-need-legal-aid (last visited Sept. 30, 2017) (defining
“justice gap” as the “difference between the level of civil legal assistance available
and the level that is necessary to meet the legal needs of low-income individuals and
families”) [https://perma.cc/M4HM-8ZY3]. Inadequate funding for and availability
of free representation in criminal matters is also a longstanding problem of
enormous magnitude. E.g., RHODE, supra note 33, at 30–35. This Article, however,
concerns civil matters as pro bono efforts generally focus on matters in which the
parties have no right to counsel.
78. See, e.g., Tonya L. Brito et al., What We Know and Need to Know About
Civil Gideon, 67 S.C. L. REV. 223, 223 (2016); Justin Hansford, Lippman’s Law:
Debating the Fifty-Hour Pro Bono Requirement for Bar Admission, 41 FORDHAM
URBAN L.J. 1141, 1173 (2014).
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largest civil legal aid funder, and its clients.79 Income eligibility for LSC
services is capped at 125% of the federal poverty standard.80 An estimated
20% of Americans meet this guideline at any given time and nearly 80%
will experience significant economic hardship by age 60.81 Similarly bleak
statistics are available from many sources.82
Notwithstanding the enormity of these numbers, LSC has suffered deep
funding cuts over the years,83 a trend likely to continue at an even greater
pace under President Donald Trump.84 Even before the Trump presidency,
50% of financially eligible individuals seeking LSC-funded representation
were turned away because of insufficient resources, amounting to “nearly a

79. See Who We Are, LEGAL SERVS. CORP., http://www.lsc.gov/aboutlsc/who-we-are (last visited Sept. 30, 2017) [https://perma.cc/5NYZ-XP92]. LSC
distributes funds for civil legal assistance to hundreds of legal aid offices. Id.
80. Id.
81. Kathryn Alfisi, Ensuring Justice for All: The White House Plan, WASH.
LAW., May 2016, at 28 (citing figures provided by Lisa Foster, Director of the
U.S. Department of Justice Office for Access to Justice).
82. See, e.g., ELIZABETH KNEEBONE, BROOKINGS, THE GREAT RECESSION AND
POVERTY IN METROPOLITAN AMERICA 2 (2010), https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2016/06/1007_suburban_poverty_acs_kneebone.pdf (“[T]he latest
data from the Census Bureau’s 2009 American Community Survey (ACS) confirm
that the worst U.S. economic downturn in decades exacerbated trends set in motion
years before, by multiplying the ranks of America’s poor. Between 2007 and 2009,
the national poverty rate rose from 13 percent to 14.3 percent, and the number of
people below the poverty line jumped by 4.9 million.”) [https://perma.cc/F9CVVZ4W]; Poverty in the United States, How many people were poor in 2015?, NAT’L
POVERTY CTR., UNIV. OF MICH., http://poverty.umich.edu/about/poverty-facts/uspoverty/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2017) (“In 2015, 13.5% of all persons [in the United
States] lived in poverty.”) [https://perma.cc/C4AF-HV5F].
83. See, e.g., Ronald S. Flagg, Access to Civil Justice: Keeping America’s
Promise, 24 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 571, 574–77 (2015); Patricia E. Roberts, From
the “War On Poverty” to Pro Bono: Access to Justice Remains Elusive for Too
Many, Including Our Veterans, 34 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 341, 347–48 (2014).
84. From the beginning, President Trump has advocated for LSC’s complete
elimination. See, e.g., Alexander Bolton, Trump Team Prepares Dramatic Cuts,
HILL (Jan. 19, 2017, 6:00 AM), http://thehill.com/policy/finance/314991-trumpteam-prepares-dramatic-cuts (noting President Trump’s reliance on a Heritage
Foundation budget-cutting proposal that would “eliminate” LSC) [https://per
ma.cc/NRR8-N5MV]; Debra Cassens Weiss, Trump budget eliminates Legal
Services Corp. funding, A.B.A. J. (Mar. 16, 2017, 8:45 AM), http://www.abajournal
.com/news/article/trump_budget_eliminates_funding_for_legal_services_corp (describing President Trump’s first federal budget, which included no funds for LSC,
and attorney opposition thereto) [https://perma.cc/LA2H-AD56].
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million” people every year.85 The “nearly a million” figure does not
include the many individuals who need and are financially eligible for an
LSC-funded attorney but do not request legal representation. This group
includes individuals who assume that representation would be impossible
to procure or do not realize that the legal system could redress their
problems.86
Decreased funding to LSC also has resulted in restrictions on the types
of matters handled, with various LSC-funded programs responding to
budgetary constraints by eliminating representation in certain types of
family law, domestic violence, housing, and consumer law cases.87 These
service cuts are in addition to politically motivated restrictions imposed by
Congress, such as prohibitions on LSC-funded representation in class
actions and representation of undocumented immigrants.88
LSC representation cuts and restrictions have resulted in calls for other
entities to “pick up the slack.”89 Many organizations have responded,
including law firms and state bar Interest on Lawyer Trust Accounts
(“IOLTA”) programs.90 Such efforts, however, do not make up the difference,
and the justice gap remains stubbornly vast.91

85. See The Unmet Need for Legal Aid, supra note 77.
86. See Rebecca L. Sandefur, Bridging the Gap: Rethinking Outreach for
Greater Access to Justice, 37 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 721, 725–27 (2015).
87. Flagg, supra note 83, at 578.
88. See, e.g., Jota Borgmann & Brian Sullivan, Demanding a Race to the Top:
The 2015 Strike Against MFY Legal Services in Context, 19 CUNY L. REV. 195,
203 (2016).
89. Jesse Newmark, Legal Aid Affairs: Collaborating With Local
Governments on the Side, 21 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 195, 311–12 (2012).
90. See, e.g., Terry Carter, Expressing Their Interest, 93 A.B.A. J., June 2007,
at 22, 23; Robert Granfield, Institutionalizing Public Service in Law School:
Results On the Impact of Mandatory Pro Bono Programs, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 1355,
1369–70 (2007). IOLTA programs operate in every state; in 2009, these programs
generated more than $124.7 million for civil legal aid providers. What is IOLTA,
IOLTA, http://www.iolta.org/what-is-iolta (last visited Sept. 30, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/HLR9-DXF5].
91. See BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, STRUGGLING TO MEET THE NEED:
COMMUNITIES CONFRONT GAPS IN FEDERAL LEGAL AID 4 (2003) (“Although
supporters of the cuts and restrictions said that state, local and private funding
would pick up the slack [in legal-services funding], and although bar leaders and
legal aid supporters find broad support for legal services in many parts of the
country, the bottom line is that these expectations have been largely unfulfilled.”);
LEGAL SERVS. CORP., RESOLUTION ADOPTING STRATEGIC DIRECTIONS FOR THE
LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION FOR 2000-2005, at 1 (2000) (noting that contributions
by state and local governments, private parties, charities, and pro bono organizations
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B. The Profession’s Insufficient Response
The ABA’s model guidance to the profession always has incorporated
an aspirational approach to pro bono obligations.92 As demonstrated
below, that approach continues to be the norm throughout the United
States, and insufficient pro bono participation is the result.
1. The Rules
In its current incarnation, ABA Model Rule 6.1 states that “[e]very lawyer
has a professional responsibility to provide legal services to those unable to
pay.”93 Fulfillment, however, remains voluntary: “A lawyer should aspire to
render at least (50) hours of pro bono public legal services per year.”94 Thus,
unlike failure to comply with the other rules of professional conduct, an
attorney’s failure to fulfill her pro bono responsibilities is not punishable
through the disciplinary process.95
The aspirational nature of Rule 6.1 extends beyond the number of
hours to the type of work encompassed under the “pro bono” label. The
rule instructs that attorneys “should” fulfill “a substantial majority” of the
50 hours by providing direct legal services to people who cannot afford
representation or to organizations engaged in such work.96 But the hours
also may be fulfilled in many other ways, including “participation in
activities for improving the law, the legal system or the legal profession”—

“are not sufficient to meet the burden imposed by inadequate governmental
investment”); David Luban, Optimism, Skepticism, and Access to Justice, 3 TEX.
A&M L. REV. 495, 496 (2016) (“Of course, LSC is only part of the legal aid story,
but other parts are no less grim.”).
92. See, e.g., Spencer Rand, A Poverty of Representation: The Attorney’s
Role To Advocate for the Powerless, 13 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 545, 558–59
(2007) (describing 1969 ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility, Ethical
Consideration 2-25, which articulated attorneys’ “responsibility” for providing
free representation but dictated only that attorneys “should” find time to discharge
that responsibility); Faith-Slaker, supra note 76, at 280–81 (describing opposition
to ABA consideration of mandatory pro bono proposals).
93. MODEL RULES r. 6.1.
94. Id. (emphasis added).
95. See id. cmt. 12. Even calling Rule 6.1 a “rule” is somewhat misleading as
it is the only Model Rule that does not actually prohibit, permit, or require
anything. See Lawrence J. Fox, Should We Mandate Doing Well By Doing Good?,
33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 249, 252–53 (2005).
96. MODEL RULES r. 6.1(a)(1)–(2).

568

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78

a category that, depending on one’s perspective, may include almost
anything.97
Most states follow the ABA’s lead, with no state requiring any pro
bono hours from its attorneys.98 About half of the states have adopted the
ABA goal of 50 voluntary hours per year, with the remainder setting a
lesser goal—generally, 20 to 30 hours per year—or making no specific
recommendation regarding the number of hours.99 Moreover, all states
with a pro bono rule follow the ABA’s broad latitude in encouraging direct
services for indigent clients but allowing service through many other
avenues as well.100
2. The Results
After almost 50 years of rules that encourage rather than require pro
bono work, American attorneys do not come close to meeting the ABA’s
Rule 6.1 aspirations.101
Looking at pro bono reports provided by the ABA and state bar
associations, however, one might conclude the opposite. The ABA in
particular touts what seem like unrealistically high levels of pro bono

97. See MODEL RULES r. 6.1(b)(3); see also Rand, supra note 92, at 558
(“[A]n attorney representing a wealthy suburban athletic league could easily
decide that he was meeting his pro bono obligation [under Rule 6.1].”).
98. Though no hours are required by New Jersey’s version of Rule 6.1, see
N.J. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 6.1, New Jersey does have a statewide pro
bono court appointment system that comes closer to requiring some degree of pro
bono than any other statewide system, see infra notes 177–182 and accompanying
text. At the other end of the spectrum, several states have no pro bono rule at all.
See, e.g., ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, Preamble (noting that the absence of
an Illinois version of Model Rule 6.1 is not intended to limit attorneys’ pro bono
responsibilities; rather, “this responsibility is not appropriate for disciplinary
rules”); OHIO RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r . 6.1 (noting that the Supreme Court
of Ohio has deferred consideration of Model Rule 6.1).
99. See, e.g., IOWA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 32:6:1 (2013) (50 hours);
MISS. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 6.1(b) (20 hours); NEB. RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT r. 3-506.1 (no specific number of hours).
100. By way of example, a broad “pro bono” definition can be found in any of
the rules cited in the immediately preceding footnote.
101. See, e.g., Lisa H. Nicholson, Access to Justice Requires Access to
Attorneys: Restrictions on the Practice of Law Serve a Societal Purpose, 82
FORDHAM L. REV. 2761, 2785 (2014) (noting the lack of sufficient “voluntary
movement” to meet the 50-hour goal); Deborah L. Rhode, Squeezing the Public
Good, A.B.A. J., Nov. 2000, at 120, 120 (“Most practitioners make no pro bono
contributions to the poor.”).
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participation.102 One ABA study, for example, found that 89% of survey
respondents performed at least one pro bono hour in 2011103 and summed
up its “key findings” as follows: “The results of this study reflect American
lawyers’ continued awareness of pro bono as a professional responsibility
and their strong ongoing commitment to volunteering their legal services to
meet the legal needs of the poor.”104
Certainly, thousands of attorneys do their part and more. This same
ABA study, for example, found that responding attorneys provided an
average of 56.5 pro bono hours in 2011; when attorneys who reported zero
pro bono hours were removed from the calculation, the average
contribution rose to 70.91 hours.105
This impressive snapshot, however, is belied by the voluntary survey
nature of the study.106 Of the 379,755 attorneys receiving questionnaires,
2,876—approximately three-quarters of one percent—responded.107 The
ABA stated that this response rate was “consistent with industry
expectations for a study of this nature,”108 but it seems unlikely that
attorneys who provided few or no pro bono hours would be inclined to
complete the survey.109 By contrast, a Virginia report that collected data
from pro bono provider organizations in the state, rather than relying on
individual attorney survey responses, suggests a less impressive picture.110
The Virginia report concluded that only nine percent of Virginia attorneys
participated in organized pro bono programs.111 Even factoring in the
102. See Rand, supra note 92, at 557 (describing ABA pro bono statistics as
“straining credibility”).
103. See A.B.A. STANDING COMM. ON PRO BONO AND PUB. SERV.,
SUPPORTING JUSTICE III: A REPORT ON THE PRO BONO WORK OF AMERICA’S
LAWYERS 9 (2013) [hereinafter SUPPORTING JUSTICE III].
104. Id. at vi.
105. Id. at vi & n.4.
106. See Luban, supra note 91, at 496–97.
107. See SUPPORTING JUSTICE III, supra note 103, at 2.
108. Id.
109. The ABA acknowledged this “possible” bias but concluded that “[i]t is
also possible that those who are particularly interested in the issue—both
supportive and unsupportive of pro bono—are more likely to self-select into the
survey,” thus skewing the findings “not in favor of pro bono, but rather in favor
of polarized views on this topic.” Id. at A-2. This Article leaves it to others to
evaluate the soundness of these various “possibilities,” but it seems unlikely that
the radically polarized survey respondents hypothesized by the ABA cancel out
the bias toward respondents who are pro bono participants.
110. See Joanna L. Suyes & John Whitfield, Is There a Pro Bono Gap in
Virginia?, VIRGINIA LAW., Feb. 2014, at 46.
111. See id. at 47.
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likely number of pro bono hours provided outside of organized programs,
the report projected that lawyers in the state provided only about eight
percent of the pro bono hours envisioned by Rule 6.1.112
Survey results also vary considerably with how respondents define
“pro bono.” Some survey respondents may count as “pro bono” almost any
unpaid activity, including services provided to non-indigent friends or
family.113 Not surprisingly, the closer a survey’s “pro bono” definition hews
to the provision of direct legal services to individuals meeting LSC’s income
restrictions, the lower the number of reported pro bono participants.114 For
example, a Nebraska survey employing a strict definition found that
approximately 58% of respondents had contributed at least one pro bono
hour in 2014.115 The much lower percentage of participating Nebraska
attorneys as compared to the ABA survey’s 89% probably reflected
Nebraska’s “more detailed and specific definition of pro bono.”116 And, of
course, even Nebraska’s 58% pro bono participation rate still reflects the
mere 14% of attorneys who responded at all.117
Looking to minimize the confusion caused by the various methods and
definitions employed in these and similar surveys, Professor Rhode
examined a cross section of state-specific data and estimated that 15 to
18% of attorneys in most jurisdictions participate in pro bono work to
some extent and that average per-attorney contributions ranged from 5 to
20 hours per year.118 Extrapolating from more recent law firm data,
Sheldon Krantz estimated a national average of between three and six pro
bono hours per attorney per year.119

112. See id. at 48.
113. See Rand, supra note 92, at 557–58.
114. See APRIL FAITH-SLAKER, LEGAL AID OF NEB., SUPPORTING JUSTICE IN
NEBRASKA: A REPORT ON THE PRO BONO WORK OF NEBRASKA’S LAWYERS 13
(2015) (“[W]hen not restricted to an objective definition, attorneys’ subjective
definitions of pro bono might be more expansive.”).
115. Id.
116. Id. Even in the ABA survey, the percentage of respondents who reported
at least one pro bono hour fell nine points when the “pro bono” definition
excluded, among other activities, “law-related” services provided at reduced cost
to organizations “that support[] legal services for . . . the general public.” See
SUPPORTING JUSTICE III, supra note 103, at 3–5, 9.
117. See FAITH-SLAKER, supra note 114, at 11.
118. RHODE, supra note 6, at 327–28. This estimate of average hours per
attorney factored in those attorneys who do no pro bono work at all. See id.
119. See KRANTZ, supra note 75, at 80. Krantz relied on data finding that only
44% of attorneys in the nation’s largest law firms—who likely contribute a “sizeable”
share of total pro bono hours—performed even 20 hours per year. Id. at 79–80.
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Acknowledging, if tacitly, that the documented level of pro bono service
demonstrates much room for improvement, the profession has focused on
“mobilizing, leveraging, and targeting” more volunteer attorneys.120 For
example, bar associations and other non-profit organizations have
implemented extensive pro bono outreach and training programs, with
certificates and awards to recognize and incentivize pro bono service.121
Although decades of such initiatives undoubtedly have contributed to the
pro bono pool, little evidence shows that such programs affect long-term
increases in pro bono participation rates.122
A more ambitious incentive implemented in nine states requires
attorneys to report the extent of their pro bono work on an annual basis,
even if the report simply states that the attorney did no pro bono work that
year.123 Mandatory reporting both reminds attorneys of the expectation
imposed by Rule 6.1 and incorporates a shaming element, assuming that
attorneys will not want to report zero pro bono hours.124
In 2013, pro bono participation in the nine mandatory reporting states
ranged from 33% of attorneys in Nevada to 57% in New Mexico.125 The
average number of hours per attorney in these states ranged from 15 hours
in Mississippi to 47 hours in Nevada.126 These numbers are fairly high,
and it seems logical that mandatory reporting might at least nudge
participation rates and hours upward. No reliable basis of comparison to
120. Scott L. Cummings & Rebecca L. Sandefur, Beyond the Numbers: What
We Know—And Should Know—About American Pro Bono, 7 HARV. L. & POL’Y
REV. 83, 84 (2013); see also RHODE, supra note 6, at 72 (“Unless and until we
can build a broader base of support for obligations that substantially benefit the
most underserved groups, the prudent alternative would be to focus on
strengthening voluntary initiatives . . . .”).
121. See, e.g., Ann Juergens & Diane Galatowitsch, A Call to Cultivate the
Public Interest: Beyond Pro Bono, 51 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 95, 109 (2016).
122. See, e.g., Cummings & Sandefur, supra note 120, at 94–95 (finding that far
more significant to pro bono behavior are workplace factors, such as attorneys
feeling financially comfortable enough to take the time to volunteer their services).
123. Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Nevada, New
Mexico, and New York require pro bono reporting. Pro Bono Reporting, AM. BAR
ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/probono_public_service/ts/pbreporting
.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2017) [https://perma.cc/EP3E-RAB2]. Thirteen additional
states provide a vehicle for attorneys to voluntarily report their pro bono work. See id.
124. See RHODE, supra note 6, at 167–68. Mandatory reporting also provides a
source of data presumably more reliable than voluntary response surveys. See id.
125. The most recent data available from the ABA is from 2013. See Pro Bono
Reporting, supra note 123.
126. These calculations included the attorneys who provided zero pro bono
hours. See id.
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states without such a requirement exists, however, and studies conducted
thus far have yet to establish a positive effect from mandatory reporting.127
C. A Mandatory Pro Bono Obligation
The inadequacy of voluntary pro bono efforts logically leads to the
consideration of a mandatory system. At least conceptually, mandatory
pro bono is justified by “unauthorized practice of law” (“UPL”)
restrictions that both privilege the legal profession and exacerbate the need
for free legal services.128
Like anyone else with a legal problem, an indigent person is far more
likely to win her case—to avoid eviction from her home, avoid losing custody
of her children, avoid deportation, and so on—if she is represented.129 With
few exceptions, however, UPL restrictions limit representation in such
matters to licensed attorneys.130 The bar has made a priority of preserving
such restrictions.131
127. See Cummings & Sandefur, supra note 120, at 94 n.37 (noting that
although Florida reported substantially increased pro bono rates after instituting
mandatory reporting, many other factors may have influenced the increase);
Rebecca L. Sandefur, Lawyers’ Pro Bono Service and American-Style Civil Legal
Assistance, 41 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 79, 100 (2007) (finding no relationship
between state reporting requirements and rates of pro bono participation).
128. See, e.g., Fox, supra note 95, at 252 (“[I]f we lawyers want to maintain
our monopoly on legal services, we clearly have an obligation individually to meet
the legal needs of the poor.”); Lininger, supra note 6, at 1343.
129. See, e.g., Rebecca L. Sandefur, Elements of Professional Expertise:
Understanding Relational and Substantive Expertise through Lawyers’ Impact, 80
AM. SOC. REV. 909, 924 (2015) (finding “spectacular” outcome differences between
legal matters handled by an attorney and legal matters handled on a pro se basis).
130. The ABA collects and describes the various states’ UPL provisions. See
Task Force on the Model Definition of the Practice of Law, AM. BAR ASS’N,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/task_force_model
_definition_practice_law.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2017) [https://perma.cc/M44U98E6]. UPL restrictions may be ripe for legal challenge in the wake of the Supreme
Court’s 2015 decision that the Federal Trade Commission could hold a state board
of dental examiners accountable for its anticompetitive efforts to drive non-dentist
teeth whitening practitioners out of the state. See N. C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’ers
v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015). UPL restrictions, however, have
resisted such challenges before as seen in the wake of a 1970s flurry of antitrust
enforcement efforts against the organized bar, which eventually gave way to today’s
vigorously enforced UPL rules. Cf. Anya E.R. Prince & Arlene M. Davis, Navigating
Professional Norms in an Inter-Professional Environment: The “practice” of
Healthcare Ethics Committees, 15 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 115, 140 (2016).
131. See, e.g., Johnstone, supra note 65, at 218–20; Lininger, supra note 6, at 1347.
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UPL restrictions protect attorneys from competition and often may
protect clients, but they also limit the pool of competent individuals
available to represent indigent persons without violating the law
themselves.132 Professor Rhode explains the “straightforward” justification
for mandatory pro bono under these market conditions: “Because access to
law so often requires access to lawyers, they bear a particular responsibility
to help make legal services available. As courts and bar ethical codes have
long noted, the state grants lawyers special monopoly privileges that
impose special obligations” for “fundamental fairness” in the legal
system.133
Mandatory pro bono opponents protest that the legal profession is not
particularly responsible for poverty and that attorneys, therefore, are not
particularly responsible for solving the poverty-driven justice gap.134
Responsibility for circumstances underlying the gap of course extends well
beyond attorneys. But this acknowledgement does not obviate attorneys’
obligation to provide assistance when—because of UPL restrictions—no
other individuals are permitted to do so and when the limitation on supply
so directly benefits the group—attorneys—who are called upon to help.
Beyond the complaint that attorneys should not be singled out for
service, mandatory pro bono opponents advance a host of other
objections.135 Some of the most common objections are outlined below, and
all of them raise important considerations suggesting a cautious path
forward. None, however, establish a significant enough concern to derail the
mandatory concept.

132. See Selina Thomas, Rethinking Unauthorized Practice of Law in Light of
the Access to Justice Crisis, 23 PROF. LAW. 17 (2016).
133. RHODE, supra note 33, at 54; see also Michael Millemann, Mandatory
Pro Bono in Civil Cases: A Partial Answer to the Right Question, 49 MD. L. REV.
18, 69 (1990). In earlier writings, Professor Rhode stopped short of endorsing a
broad pro bono requirement, a choice criticized as inconsistent with her evaluation
of the inadequacies of voluntary pro bono. See Lininger, supra note 6, at 1353–
55. Rhode’s more recent work evinces a change of position. See RHODE, supra
note 33, at 54 (advocating a 50 hour-per-year pro bono requirement).
134. See, e.g., Rob Atkinson, A Social-Democratic Critique of Pro Bono Publico
Representation of the Poor: The Good as the Enemy of the Best, 9 AM. U. J. GENDER
SOC. POL’Y & L. 129, 152–54 (2001); Michael A. Mogill, Professing Pro Bono: To
Walk the Talk, 15 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 5, 22 (2001).
135. See, e.g., Kellie Isbell & Sarah Sawle, Pro Bono Publico: Voluntary
Service and Mandatory Reporting, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 845, 850–52 (2002).
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1. Constitutionality
Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s recent comment that she believes in “forced
labor” for pro bono obligations brought a flurry of criticism, including the
argument that mandatory pro bono would violate the Thirteenth
Amendment’s prohibition on “involuntary servitude.”136 Other
constitutional arguments against mandatory pro bono include the First
Amendment’s prohibition on forced association, the Fifth Amendment’s
prohibition on uncompensated takings, and the Fourteenth Amendment’s
equal protection guarantee.137
No state employs a mandatory pro bono scheme, so these constitutional
theories have yet to be tested directly. Similar arguments, however, have
been widely rejected in analogous contexts, including cases in which
attorneys have challenged uncompensated court appointments.138
Mandatory pro bono requirements might be found unconstitutional even if
court appointments are not.139 The current legal landscape, however,

136. See supra note 3 and accompanying text; Ilya Somin, Justice Sotomayor’s
Misguided Advocacy of “Forced Labor” for Lawyers [Updated With a Response
to Steve Lubet], WASH. POST (May 20, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/05/20/justice-sotomayors-misguided-advocacyof-forced-labor-for-lawyers/?utm_term=.6c544914d86d [https://perma.cc/KD3J-S
FCK].
137. See, e.g., Reed Elizabeth Loder, Tending The Generous Heart: Mandatory
Pro Bono and Moral Development, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 459, 464–65 (2001).
138. See, e.g., Family Div. Trial Lawyers of Superior Court, Inc. v. Moultrie, 725
F.2d 695, 704–07 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (rejecting involuntary servitude and takings
arguments, though noting that particularly burdensome appointments could be
unconstitutional takings if they deprived attorneys of the ability to make a living);
Madden v. Twp. of Delran, 601 A.2d 211, 215–16 (N.J. 1992) (rejecting takings
argument against municipal court assignments system). See generally Roger C.
Cramton, Mandatory Pro Bono, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1113, 1131–32 (1991);
Lininger, supra note 6, at 1357; Millemann, supra note 133, at 49–55. In the one
reported challenge to required pro bono reporting, see supra notes 123–127 and
accompanying text, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the plaintiffs’ due process and equal
protection arguments. See Schwartz v. Kogan, 132 F.3d 1387, 1392 (11th Cir. 1998).
139. See John C. Scully, Mandatory Pro Bono: An Attack on the Constitution,
19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1229, 1243 (1991) (arguing that mandatory pro bono would
lack the “careful balancing of interests” that might justify court appointment in a
particular matter). But see Cramton, supra note 138, at 1132 (“A mandatory pro
bono program requiring 20 hours a year of work for poor clients in civil matters
raises fewer constitutional questions than does the court appointment practice.”).
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provides little reason to believe that such a reversal of course is imminent or
likely.140
2. Misdirected Resources
Some mandatory pro bono opponents argue that the substantial energy
and resources required to enact, implement, and administer mandatory
measures would be better directed toward fighting for the superior
solution: increased government funding for LSC and other professional
civil legal aid providers.141
This argument begins with the clearly correct proposition that
professional legal aid attorneys generally provide the best legal aid
representation. The argument falters, however, with the assumption that
moving from voluntary to mandatory measures would leech energy and
funding from that goal. Decades of voluntary pro bono have seen nothing
but decreased funding for LSC and similar organizations.142 Although
moving to a mandatory system might accelerate LSC’s funding decline at
an even more alarming rate, it cannot be said that remaining in a voluntary
system is likely to bring improved resources to professional legal aid
providers.
Indeed, if, as seems certain, mandatory pro bono measures would be
unpopular among various segments of the attorney population, such
resistance might actually spark a drive for increased legal aid funding. Such
funding might come from local governments, as happened when the Chief
Justice of the New Jersey Supreme Court ordered pro bono appointments to
represent indigent sex offenders challenging their obligation to register with
local police. Attorney pushback was swift and vociferous and resulted in the
governor allocating new funds to hire additional public defenders to handle

140. See Somin, supra note 136 (arguing that although mandatory pro bono
should be considered unconstitutional, “such a program might well be permissible
under existing Supreme Court precedent”).
141. See, e.g., Atkinson, supra note 134, at 131 (arguing that a push for
mandatory pro bono would put increased funding for professional legal services
“farther out of reach”); Samuel R. Bagenstos, Mandatory Pro Bono and Private
Attorneys General, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1459, 1467 (2007) (arguing that
mandatory pro bono “will likely make it harder to obtain political support” for
increased legal services funding); Esther F. Lardent, Mandatory Pro Bono in Civil
Cases: The Wrong Answer to the Right Question, 49 MD. L. REV. 78, 99–100
(1990) (arguing that the substantial funds necessary for mandatory program
administration would be better spent on client services).
142. See supra notes 83–84 and accompanying text.
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these cases.143 Additional funding also might come from attorneys
themselves, as mandatory pro bono measures likely would come with a
buy-out option for attorneys who are unable or unwilling to provide direct
services in any given year, with proceeds going to legal aid providers.144
3. Second-Rate Representation
Another related argument against mandatory pro bono is that the
quality of conscripted representation by resentful attorneys will be
especially low.145 Some attorneys may work less diligently on unpaid
matters, and pro bono clients may be less likely to take action against
inattentive or otherwise incompetent counsel.146 Competence, however, is
no less an obligation in pro bono representation than it is in paid
representation, and the vast majority of attorneys will provide competent
legal representation, at the very least to protect their bar licenses and
reputations.147
4. Current Volunteers
Yet another objection to mandatory pro bono concerns the potentially
negative impact on current pro bono volunteers. Mandating pro bono for
all attorneys might diminish the enthusiasm and commitment of current
participants—precisely those attorneys who might serve as models and

143. See Michael P. Ambrosio & Denis F. Mclaughlin, The Redefining of
Professional Ethics in New Jersey Under Chief Justice Robert Wilentz: A Legacy
of Reform, 7 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 351, 409–10 (1997).
144. The current version of Model Rule 6.1 allows attorneys unable to fulfill the
recommended 50 voluntary hours per year to “discharge the pro bono responsibility
by providing financial support to organizations providing free legal services to
persons of limited means” in an amount “reasonably equivalent to the value of the
hours of service that would have otherwise been provided.” MODEL RULES r. 6.1
cmt. 9. A similar buy-out provision presumably would be seen as even more
necessary in a mandatory system. See, e.g., Quintin Johnstone, Law and Policy
Issues Concerning the Provision of Adequate Legal Services for the Poor, 20
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 571, 607 (2011) (arguing for a mandatory system with
a buy-out option equivalent to legal aid attorneys’ average two-week salary).
145. See, e.g., Somin, supra note 136.
146. See Barbara Graves-Poller, Is Pro Bono Practice in Legal “Backwaters”
Beyond the Scope of the Model Rules?, 13 U.N.H. L. REV. 1, 4–5, 24 (2015).
147. Competence is required of all attorneys in all matters. See MODEL RULES r.
1.1; see also Ann Fenton, The Pro Bono Paradox, DRI FOR DEF., March 2011, at
75 (“Lawyers should provide pro bono services, [but] must do so competently.”).
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mentors for those new to pro bono work.148 Such a mandate might even
cause current volunteers to decrease their hours to the bare minimum
requirement.149 Any mandatory scheme should incorporate formal
recognition and other incentives for volunteers who remain willing to
exceed minimum expectations.
5. Insufficient Response
Finally, many have observed that requiring every attorney to
contribute 50 or more pro bono hours per year still would not close the
justice gap.150 Rather than undermining the case for a mandatory system,
however, this argument underscores the need for multi-faceted solutions.
In addition to increased funding for LSC and similar organizations, such
solutions could include less-restrictive UPL regulations, allowing nonattorneys to provide certain legal services,151 and “low-bono” initiatives,
allowing greater access to representation for clients who cannot afford
market-rate attorneys but earn too much to qualify for LSC services.152

148. See, e.g., Loder, supra note 137, at 474 (discussing potential “undermining
effect” on current volunteers).
149. Id. at 477–78.
150. See, e.g., Granfield, supra note 90, at 1410 (finding it “extremely
doubtful” that private pro bono “will ever adequately provide for the legal needs
of the poor”); Gillian K. Hadfield, Higher Demand, Lower Supply? A
Comparative Assessment of the Legal Resource Landscape for Ordinary
Americans, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 129, 152 (2010) (“[E]ven if every lawyer in
the country did 100 more hours a year of pro bono work, this would amount to an
extra thirty minutes per U.S. person a year, or about an hour per dispute-related
(potentially litigation-related) problem per household.”).
151. See, e.g., Lininger, supra note 6, at 1364 (arguing that, if efforts to
increase pro bono are insufficient, “state legislatures should begin to roll back the
legal monopoly that is responsible for the inaccessibility of legal services”);
Sandefur, supra note 12, at 910 (finding that non-attorney representatives can
have a “powerful impact” in many “civil matters that can lead to bankruptcy,
penury, homelessness, and lost custody”); Thomas, supra note 132, at 22
(encouraging reassessment of UPL restrictions in light of “the public’s need for
access to the civil justice system and the public’s right to have meaningful choices
in civil legal representation”). A related initiative might support increased
resources to promote effective pro se representation. See, e.g., Deborah J.
Cantrell, Justice for Interests of the Poor: The Problem of Navigating the System
Without Counsel, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1573, 1581 (2002).
152. See Hadfield, supra note 150, at 148 (documenting “average” households’
lack of access to legal services).
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Although requiring mandatory pro bono hours is not a complete
solution, the requirement would mean that many more indigent individuals
would have access to sorely needed legal representation.153 To accept the
voluntary pro bono status quo is to forego an enormous potential resource.
III. RETHINKING THE STATUS QUO
Mandatory CLE does not serve its purpose of increasing attorney
competence. Voluntary pro bono does not come close to meeting the
public need created, in part, by monopolistic UPL restrictions. These
observations lead to more than one potential conclusion, including simply
eliminating mandatory CLE. But the possibility of trading an unjustified
requirement for one with promise should be explored and leveraged.
A. Counting Pro Bono Hours Toward CLE Requirements
One currently promoted alternative implicitly recognizes the potential
for a status quo shift. Beginning with Wyoming in 2003, 11 states now
allow attorneys to count a small number of qualifying pro bono hours
toward mandatory CLE requirements.154 This arrangement is justified both
as providing a significant learning experience for the attorney, thus fitting
within mandatory CLE’s educational mandate, and as encouraging
additional pro bono work, thus making a dent in the justice gap not filled
through traditional pro bono incentives.155

153. See, e.g., Tom Lininger, Volition and Voltaire: A Response to Professor
Bagenstos, 101 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 192, 194 (2007) (“Hoping for a surge
in voluntary pro bono work (which I’ll admit would be the perfect solution) could
delay the improvement that a mandatory regime could bring.”); Steven Wechsler,
Attorneys’ Attitudes Toward Mandatory Pro Bono, 41 SYRACUSE L. REV. 909,
924 (1990) (“Perhaps the single most compelling argument in favor of making
pro bono service mandatory is the tremendous unmet legal needs of the poor in
our society and the fact that mandatory pro bono appears to be one of the most
viable ways for beginning to meet those needs.”).
154. The 11 states are Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Louisiana, Minnesota,
New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Tennessee, Washington, and Wyoming. CLE
Rules, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/probono_public
_service/policy/cle_rules.html (last updated Oct. 2017) [https://perma.cc/Q46BTX2A].
155. See John Caher, State Board Adopts CLE Rules Allowing for Pro Bono
Credit, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 6, 2000, at 1; Melissa H. Weresh, Service: A Prescription
for the Lost Lawyer, 2014 J. PROF. LAW. 45, 77–78 (2014); Jason B. Wesoky,
Credit Where Credit Is Due, COLO. LAW., Aug. 2012, at 115.
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The impact of this seemingly win-win arrangement on pro bono
service has yet to be determined. As a large-scale solution, however, it
presents problems both in practice and in theory. As a practical matter,
state rules protect the profitable mandatory CLE industry. Although the
rules vary somewhat among the 11 states, most allow three or fewer yearly
mandatory CLE credit hours to be fulfilled by pro bono work, and most
require 15 hours of pro bono work to earn those three hours of CLE
credit.156 Although the nod to pro bono work is undoubtedly a welcome
gesture,157 the math undermines its value as a pro bono incentive.
One option is to change the math, allowing attorneys to fully discharge
their mandatory CLE obligations through pro bono hours and allowing one
pro bono hour to count for one mandatory CLE hour.158 The typical 10 to
15 mandatory CLE hours required in most states might not encourage the
most meaningful pro bono contributions, but that problem could be
alleviated somewhat if participants could discharge, say, 45 hours once
every three years rather than 15 hours every year.
A more fundamental issue, however, is that CLE and pro bono work
are intended to serve different purposes.159 If completing the full complement
of mandatory CLE hours does not enhance attorney competence, then such
hours should not be required. If, on the other hand, more pro bono service is
needed, then the bar should consider making pro bono mandatory without
tying the hours to an ill-fitting mandatory CLE structure.
B. A Full Switch Is Premature
Although counting pro bono hours toward CLE requirements is an
unsatisfying solution, substantial reasons still favor a limited approach
rather than a full-scale switch to voluntary CLE and mandatory pro bono.
First, opposition on both fronts would be formidable and probably
insurmountable. Second, although the absence of data justifies eliminating
mandatory CLE, far better data is needed regarding mandatory pro bono
before it could be justified as an effective approach to addressing the
justice gap.

156. See Weresh, supra note 155, at 77–78.
157. See Rhode & Ricca, supra note 7, at 10 (noting popularity of such
programs notwithstanding their limitations, especially among attorneys who view
mandatory CLE as “mindless busywork”).
158. See Lininger, supra note 6, at 1363.
159. See Christopher D. Bryan, Why Lawyers Should Just Say No, COLO.
LAW., Aug. 2012, at 115; Shepard, supra note 11, at 322–23.
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1. Political Impossibility
As a practical matter, a status quo switch is politically impossible at
this juncture. From the CLE side, Michigan is the only state to have
rescinded a CLE requirement, and that requirement was limited to ten
hours per year for the first three years of bar admission with courses
provided by the state bar association for free.160 The hope was that
Michigan attorneys would develop an appreciation for CLE and would
voluntarily pay for CLE courses after the three-year mandatory CLE period
expired.161 That hope did not materialize, and new Michigan attorneys
resented mandatory attendance at the admittedly sub-par offerings.162 Thus,
the program was of no financial value to providers, and its elimination in
1994, five years after adoption, was accomplished apparently with little
resistance.163 Eliminating mandatory CLE in other jurisdictions—where
courses, for the most part, are not free and where the requirement extends
throughout attorneys’ professional lives—would undoubtedly meet fierce
resistance from bar associations and other providers.
From the pro bono side, imposing a new requirement would also
encounter widespread resistance. As observed by Professor David Luban,
“[M]andatory proposals have always met with hostility, and in my view
the prospects for mandatory pro bono are so dim that it is a waste of time
to continue talking about it.”164 In addition to the anti-mandatory
160. See Michael Franck, Michigan’s MCLE—An Idea Whose Time Has Not
Yet Come?, 72 MICH. B.J. 1132, 1132 (1993).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. See Davison, Farmer & Kane, supra note 1, at 10 (“The [Michigan]
experiment was widely viewed as a disaster.”); Cynthia McLoughlin, Michigan
Lawyers Reject Mandatory Continuing Legislation, MICH. SOC’Y FOR
PSYCHOANALYTIC PSYCHOL. (Oct. 2002), http://www.mspp.net/mcloughlin2.htm
(“[The Michigan rule] was universally detested by the young lawyers (who found
the requirements irrelevant to their professional educational needs), and no one
else liked it, either.”) [https://perma.cc/8548-V6EJ]; TASK FORCE ON
CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC., supra note 44, at 26–27, 27 n.11 (“The Michigan
Bar’s recommendation to rescind the rule was based on . . . its conclusion that the
MCLE system . . . was not achieving its intended result of ensuring that attorneys
newly admitted to the practice of law acquire the values and skills that are
necessary to discharge their professional duties . . . . Course evaluations and
comments from new attorneys about the MCLE system were overwhelmingly
negative.”).
164. David Luban, Faculty Pro Bono and the Question of Identity, 49 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 58, 58 (1999); see also Lardent, supra note 141, at 78–79 (noting the
“ultimate futility” of mandatory pro bono proposals given “political realities”).
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arguments discussed above,165 attorneys as a practical matter are unlikely
to support imposing a new obligation on themselves. The resistance might
be particularly fierce—and understandably so—from attorneys practicing
in settings with fewer resources to absorb the cost of the added obligation.
Removing the CLE requirement at the same time might blunt some of the
opposition. Effective pro bono, however, probably requires more hours
than are currently imposed by CLE requirements.166 Just as the relative
burden from mandatory CLE is greater for solo practitioners and other
attorneys with fewer resources,167 so too would be the pro bono burden.
2. Dearth of Mandatory Pro Bono Experience
In addition to the political hurdles, adding a broad pro bono
requirement would be unjustified from an evidentiary perspective. At this
point, scholars’ understanding of even voluntary pro bono efforts is
limited. Sociologist Rebecca Sandefur and others have identified the
urgent need for better research in the pro bono arena.168 For example, what
types of pro bono training and oversight are most useful for attorneys who
come from a variety of backgrounds? Are certain types of legal matters
more amenable than others to pro bono representation? How many hours
are required realistically for effective representation in different types of
matters?169
As little as is known about the efficacy of voluntary pro bono models,
even less is understood about mandatory models because, as discussed
below, so few jurisdictions have experimented with mandatory programs.
Data is needed to discern, for example, the extent to which mandatory
programs increase the net number of pro bono hours and whether they
improve the quality of pro bono representation. Without such data, the two
165. See supra notes 134–151 and accompanying text.
166. See, e.g., Milan Markovic, Juking Access to Justice to Deregulate the
Legal Market, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 63, 87 (2016) (observing that even 30
hours of pro bono service is “insufficient to resolve all but uncomplicated
matters”).
167. See supra notes 31–32 and accompanying text.
168. See Catherine R. Albiston & Rebecca L. Sandefur, Expanding the
Empirical Study of Access to Justice, 2013 WISC. L. REV. 101, 103–04 (2013);
Cummings & Sandefur, supra note 120, at 103–05; Sandefur, supra note 129, at
927; see also Faith-Slaker, supra note 76, at 284 (“Without more information, . .
. programs and policies meant to increase pro bono participation and ultimately
provide better access to justice for the impoverished population rest on little more
than speculation.”).
169. The authorities referenced in the immediately preceding footnote raise
these questions, among others.
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sides to the mandatory debate can continue their arguments only in the
hypothetical realm.170
Various bar association committees occasionally have proposed
mandatory programs, but almost none have been implemented.171 One
“renegade jurisdiction” that did adopt such a mandate is Orange County,
Florida.172 The Orange County Bar Association requires all members to
accept two Legal Aid case referrals per year, contribute $350 to Legal Aid,
or participate in an alternative approved project.173 Members credit the
program’s continuing success to its 50-year duration, which has instilled
acceptance of pro bono as the norm of practice, and to its even-handed
structure, which includes no exemptions.174 Still, bar membership itself is
voluntary,175 and an initiative to implement the Orange County plan on a
statewide basis was unsuccessful.176
170. Cf. Loder, supra note 137, at 474–75 (“[I]t is surely premature to rule out
a pro bono requirement by relying on limited research.”).
171. See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Pro Bono in Principle and in Practice, 53
J. LEGAL EDUC. 413, 425–26 (2003) (describing the ABA’s rejection of
mandatory pro bono initiatives in 1983, 1993, and 2001).
172. Cummings & Sandefur, supra note 120, at 84 & n.7; see also Wechsler,
supra note 153, at 920–21, 921 n.77 (identifying seven counties with mandatory
pro bono programs in 1987). El Paso County, Texas, another “renegade
jurisdiction,” see Cummings & Sandefur, supra note 120, at 84 & n.7, required
county bar members to accept pro bono criminal defense work; that program,
however, was suspended in 2014 for reasons that are unclear. See Kendra Emi
Nitta, Comment, An Ethical Evaluation of Mandatory Pro Bono, 29 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 909, 934 (1996) (describing the El Paso program); Email correspondence
with Nancy Gallego, Executive Director, El Paso Bar Association (Apr. 27, 2016)
(on file with author) (confirming discontinuance of program, but providing no
reason).
173. See Pro Bono Policy of the Legal Aid Society Board of Trustees, LEGAL
AID SOC’Y OF THE ORANGE CTY. BAR ASS’N, http://www.legalaidocba.org/probono-policy (last visited Sept. 30, 2017) [https://perma.cc/YTA2-KTK8];
Catherine A. Tucker, Celebrating 50 Years: History of the Pro Bono Program of
the Legal Aid Society of the Orange County Bar Association, Inc., THE BRIEFS,
Oct. 2010, at 13.
174. See Wechsler, supra note 153, at 935–37 (describing Orange County
attorney survey results); Tucker, supra note 173, at 13.
175. See Lardent, supra note 141, at 80 (“Voluntary bar programs which
condition membership on the commitment to provide service or funds, like the
program in Orange County, Florida, certainly are not mandatory since the only
‘sanction’—the inability to join the local bar—has no direct economic or
professional impact on the attorney.”).
176. See History of Pro Bono Legal Assistance in Florida, FLORIDAPROBONO,
http://www.floridaprobono.org/about/item.3304-History_of_Pro_Bono_Legal
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The closest analogy to a statewide pro bono requirement is found in
New Jersey, where most bar members must register with the Superior
Court’s pro bono appointment system.177 If assigned a case, the attorney is
required to accept it, though the system exempts various categories of
attorneys, including those who performed 25 qualifying pro bono hours in
the preceding year.178 The New Jersey system is a substantial step short of
mandatory pro bono, as attorneys are not assigned cases on a yearly,
biannual, or other regular basis.179 Still, New Jersey attorneys tend to
perceive themselves as being under a pro bono requirement, and many
resent the imposition.180
The literature reveals no current assessments of the New Jersey
system’s effectiveness in addressing that state’s justice gap. In 2015, the
_Assistance_in_Florida (last visited Sept. 30, 2017) [https://perma.cc/H868-JUZ9].
177. See New Jersey Pro Bono Information, N.J. COURTS, http://www.njcourts
.gov/attorneys/probono.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2017) (“Attorneys are assigned
pro bono cases through the Administrative Office of the Court’s pro bono computer
system, which maintains an alphabetical list of attorneys eligible for pro bono
assignment for each county.”) [https://perma.cc/DL4T-VRSB]. The obligation
stems from Madden v. Twp. of Delran, 601 A.2d 211, 222 (N.J. 1992), which held
that New Jersey attorneys must accept, without pay, judicial assignment to
represent indigent defendants.
178. Also exempted are government attorneys, legal services attorneys, and
retired attorneys. Memorandum from Glenn A. Grant, J.A.D. to Members of the
N.J. Bar (Dec. 29, 2015), http://www.njcourts.gov/attorneys/assets/probono
/memotothebaronexemptions.pdf [https://perma.cc/S2Z8-K2PB]. The pro bono
exemption—similar to the broad “pro bono” definition in Model Rule 6.1—
includes work not only for direct service providers, but also for other “nonprofit
charitable, religious, civic, community, or educational organizations or
governmental entities . . . where payment of standard legal fees would
significantly deplete the organization’s or entity’s economic resources or would
otherwise be inappropriate.” 1 N.J. PRAC., CT. R. ANN 1:21-11(a)(iv).
179. See Frequently Asked Questions—Pro Bono Assignments, N.J. COURTS,
http://www.njcourts.gov/attorneys/assets/probono/probonofaq.pdf (last visited
Nov. 9, 2017) (“Attorneys are called upon whenever their name reaches the top
of the list. For example, depending on the county, an attorney may be required to
complete two cases a year or one case every two years.”) [https://perma.cc/E6GA2SLR].
180. See, e.g., John M. Covaleski, More Pro Bono? A Case with Legs, N.J.L.:
WKLY. NEWSPAPER, July 4, 2005, at 1 (“New Jersey is believed the only state
with mandatory pro bono, a fact that has long infuriated private practitioners
here.”); MichaelAnn Knotts, More Mandatory Pro Bono Likely?, N.J.L.: WKLY.
NEWSPAPER, July 21, 2003, at 1 (“The mandatory pro bono system has long
infuriated many lawyers in New Jersey, the only state in the nation in which
attorneys are forced to take on cases for free.”).
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Superior Court assigned 1,546 pro bono cases, but the judiciary does not
keep track of how often each individual attorney is assigned to a case, how
many hours are spent handling such cases, or how well such cases are
handled.181 The literature also does not reveal why the New Jersey system
apparently is the subject of widespread resentment, when Orange County
attorneys do not seem to share that feeling about their system.182 The
difference could stem from the fact that Orange County bar membership
is optional, that its pro bono requirements apply to all bar members without
exception, or that its system is administered through Legal Aid rather than
through the court system. Determining the cause of the difference could
shine a much-needed light on more and less effective mandatory models.
C. Shifting Responsibility to Aspiring Attorneys
With pro bono participation rates far below 50 hours per year and with
little support from attorneys for imposing a pro bono requirement on
themselves, the profession has turned its gaze to a group with little ability
to protest: aspiring attorneys—a group that includes both recent law school
graduates applying for bar admission and current law students.183 The bar
applicant effort seems to have stalled after a successful push in New York,
and the law student effort—although fairly widespread—has yet to
demonstrate the anticipated benefits.
Beginning in 2015, New York has required applicants to complete 50
pro bono hours as a condition of admission to the bar.184 Supporters
believed that the new requirement would both help address New York’s
justice gap and “ensure that all lawyers who practice in New York

181. Email from Julie A. Higg, Chief of Judicial Services (May 18, 2016) (on
file with author). The 1,546 attorneys to whom these cases were assigned
represent approximately 3.5% of the 41,569 lawyers active in New Jersey in 2015.
See ABA National Lawyer Population Survey, supra note 19.
182. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
183. See, e.g., Atkinson, supra note 134, at 162 (arguing that mandatory
student pro bono is unfair for a variety of reasons, including that law students
“have the least say in their professional obligations”); Cummings & Sandefur,
supra note 120, at 84 (“[U]nwilling to directly force lawyers to provide mandatory
services, [New York]’s chief judge issued a rule targeting aspirants—requiring
law students to perform fifty hours of unpaid work as a condition of bar
admission.”).
184. See N.Y. CT. R. § 520.16. A 1997 effort to mandate pro bono service for
all New York attorneys was widely and successfully resisted by rank-and-file bar
members. Granfield, supra note 90, at 1362–64.
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understand that a culture of service is a core value of our profession.”185
Initial reports attest to the ready availability of pro bono opportunities for
all New York applicants who require them,186 but it is premature to assess
the program’s overall efficacy.187
No other state has followed New York’s lead.188 In 2016, California
Governor Jerry Brown vetoed a similar measure, citing the unfair extra
burden that the pro bono requirement would foist on new law graduates,
many of whom already were burdened with enormous debt.189 Governor
Brown suggested that lowering the cost of law school would more
effectively expand new graduates’ pro bono opportunities.190 Measures
also stalled in Connecticut and New Jersey, with court-sponsored study
groups opining that law schools in those states already had undertaken
measures to instill in students a sense of the importance of pro bono
work.191
Indeed, law schools have implemented programs to promote student
pro bono, an effort that has taken on additional urgency with recent

185. Jonathan Lippmann, New York’s Template to Address the Crisis in Civil
Legal Services, 7 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 13, 26 (2013).
186. See Stephen Ceasar, State Bar Considers Requiring All Law Students to
Do Free Legal Work, L.A. T IMES (Mar. 12, 2015, 4:00 AM), http://www.la
times.com/local/california/la-me-adv-legal-aid-students-20150312-story.html
[https://perma.cc/2YM3-R8BC]; Cheryl Miller, Would-Be Lawyers May Have to
Give It Away, RECORDER (Mar. 4, 2016), http://www.therecorder.com/id=120
2751484819/WouldBe-Lawyers-May-Have-to-Give-It-Away?slreturn=2017010
3223624 [https://perma.cc/GB3Q-62YQ].
187. See Andrew Denney, Q&A: Helaine Barnett, N.Y.L.J. (Mar. 4, 2016),
http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202751284803/QA-Helaine-Barnett?slre
turn=20170029113736 [https://perma.cc/95BV-G4VA]; Miller, supra note 186.
188. See Bar Pre-Admission Pro Bono, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.american
bar.org/groups/probono_public_service/policy/bar_pre_admission_pro_bono.html
(last visited Sept. 30, 2017) (listing states considering pre-admission pro bono
requirements) [https://perma.cc/TDR2-R5Q3].
189. David Siders, Pro Bono Rule for New California Lawyers? Not So Fast,
Jerry Brown Says, SACRAMENTO BEE (Aug. 29, 2016, 6:16 PM), http://www.sac
bee.com/news/politics-government/capitol-alert/article98734647.html [https://per
ma.cc/BRX6-NTZT].
190. Id.
191. See Karen Sloan, Pro Bono Mandate Gains Steam, NAT’L L.J. (Apr. 23,
2013), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202596770850/Pro-Bono-Man
date-Gains-Steam?slreturn=20170029114151 (describing California’s thenascendant proposal as well as the stalled Connecticut and New Jersey proposals)
[https://perma.cc/2AT3-GHLF].
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pressures to produce “practice ready” graduates.192 The ABA requires law
schools to provide “substantial” pro bono opportunities for all students.193
More specifically, the American Association of Law Schools (“AALS”)
requires schools to offer students a “well-supervised pro bono
opportunity” that is either required or made attractive enough to encourage
“the great majority of students” to participate.194 As of August 2017, 42
accredited law schools required student pro bono or other public or
community service as a condition of graduation, and another 124 had
formal programs in place to encourage student pro bono, with paid
coordinators or other administrative support.195
In addition to developing professional skills, the hope is that student
pro bono programs will instill a “life-long habit of service” that endures
throughout an attorney’s career.196 Law schools have experimented with a
variety of innovative student pro bono programs to meet this goal.197 The
existing data on student pro bono efforts, however, demonstrates that no
student pro bono model—neither mandatory programs nor strongly
supported voluntary programs—increases participants’ post-graduation
pro bono rates.198

192. See ALLIANCE FOR EXPERIENTIAL LEARNING IN LAW, Experience the
Future: Papers from the Second National Symposium on Experiential Education
in Law, 7 ELON L. REV. 1, 78 (2015).
193. See AM. BAR ASS’N, A.B.A. STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR
APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS 2015-2016, at 16 (2016).
194. See ASS’N OF AM. LAW SCHOOLS, LEARNING TO SERVE: THE FINDINGS
AND PROPOSALS OF THE AALS COMMISSION ON PRO BONO AND PUBLIC SERVICE
OPPORTUNITIES 359 (Oct. 1999).
195. See Pro Bono Programs Chart, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.americanbar
.org/groups/probono_public_service/resources/directory_of_law_school_public_
interest_pro_bono_programs/pb_programs__chart.html (last updated Sept. 21,
2017) [https://perma.cc/6ATV-XZQA]. Most of the mandatory programs require
20–70 hours of law-related pro bono service before graduation. Id.
196. See, e.g., Cummings & Sandefur, supra note 120, at 93.
197. See, e.g., Lisa A. Kloppenberg & Lori E. Shaw, Pro Bono: Assessing Aims
and Achievement, 40 U. TOL. L. REV. 357 (2009) (describing a voluntary student pro
bono program at University of Dayton Law School); Richard F. Storrow & Patti
Gearhart Turner, Where Equal Justice Begins: Mandatory Pro Bono in American
Legal Education, 72 UMKC L. REV. 493 (2003) (describing a mandatory student
pro bono program at Texas Wesleyan University School of Law).
198. See Faith-Slaker, supra note 76, at 279–80. A study by Professor Rhode
found that a “positive experience” with law school pro bono “may increase
participants’ desire for future opportunities [and] their understanding of pro bono
service as a professional obligation.” That interest, however, did not translate into
increased pro bono service after graduation, regardless of whether respondents

2017]

MAKING CLE VOLUNTARY AND PRO BONO MANDATORY

587

One reason why law student pro bono programs do not achieve the
desired “pro bono habit” may stem from law professors’ failures to model
any such “habit” themselves, conveying the impression that pro bono
obligations are appropriately shouldered by those lowest on the
professional totem pole.199 Students seem to recognize the distinction in
pro bono expectations for themselves and their teachers.200 Respondents
to a survey of recent law graduates, for example, expressed dissatisfaction
with faculty indifference to pro bono, perceiving that professors neither
undertake such work themselves nor emphasize pro bono themes in their
classrooms.201 As addressed below, students’ perceptions in this regard are
well-founded.
IV. LAW FACULTY: THE RIGHT FIT FOR A MANDATORY
PRO BONO TEST CASE
Dean Chemerinsky’s 2004 call for mandatory faculty pro bono, or at
least a serious discussion of the topic, has yet to materialize.202 Every
indication is that law professors’ view of their own pro bono obligations
remains now as he observed it then: a worthwhile activity, perhaps, but not
an integral facet of legal academic life.203 A reconsideration of law
faculties’ self-awarded pro bono pass is long overdue. A mandatory pro
bono test case focused on law faculty would respond to the intersection of
the three current problems discussed above: (1) the insufficient pro bono
hours provided to those in need; (2) the dearth of mandatory pro bono
initiatives to study and learn from; and (3) the widely shared but unachieved
goal of instilling a “pro bono habit” in those who aspire to enter the
profession.

participated in mandatory or voluntary programs while in school. RHODE, supra
note 6, at 160–64; see also Granfield, supra note 90, at 1372–73, 1380–94 (finding
no relationship between type of law school pro bono program and subsequent pro
bono work).
199. See Atkinson, supra note 134, at 161–65.
200. See RHODE, supra note 6, at 170.
201. Id.
202. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
203. See Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 1238 (“[M]y sense in most law schools
is that a faculty member’s pro bono work is looked on about the same as if he or
she likes to hike on weekends.”).
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The rationale for mandatory pro bono applies at least as strongly to
law professors as it does to other attorneys.204 As is true for other sectors
of the profession, law faculty benefit handsomely from the monopolistic
conditions that contribute to the continuing justice gap.205 Almost all states
require law school graduation as a condition of bar admission,206 which
keeps tuition dollars flowing. UPL rules protect attorney incomes, some
part of which find their way back to law schools through alumni donations.
These law school and UPL requirements contribute substantially to law
faculty salaries, the highest in academia,207 and depress the availability of
free and affordable representation.208
Nonetheless, many law professors strenuously object to participating
in pro bono work, partly due to practical concerns, such as lack of ability
and time, and partly due to self-identification more as scholars than as
attorneys.209 Faculty at one school rejected a pro bono requirement for
professors mere “seconds” after approving such a requirement for students.210
At another school, the committee proposing mandatory student pro bono
declined to even suggest such a requirement for faculty, fearing that doing
so might derail the entire proposal.211
With so little support for mandatory pro bono generally and faculty
resistance to engaging even voluntarily in pro bono work, adoption of a
widespread faculty pro bono requirement is—realistically—nowhere on
the horizon. Certainly, no such change appears forthcoming from the
profession itself, which takes such broad and vague positions on faculty
204. See supra notes 128–133 and accompanying text; cf. Luban, supra note
164, at 58–59 (arguing that law faculty, like other attorneys, have a moral
obligation to voluntarily participate in pro bono work).
205. See Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 1238; Luban, supra note 164, at 64–
68; Deborah L. Rhode, The Professional Responsibilities of Professors, 51 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 158, 162 (2001).
206. A small number of states allow multi-year apprenticeships in lieu of law
school, but few aspiring attorneys take this route, and even fewer succeed. See,
e.g., Sean Patrick Farrell, The Lawyer’s Apprentice, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2014,
at ED22 (reporting that only 60 of 83,986 people who took a bar exam in 2013
had not attended law school; of these, 17 passed the exam).
207. See Akane Otani, The Highest-Paid Professors in the U.S., BLOOMBERG
(Mar. 17, 2015, 10:18 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-0317/the-highest-paid-professors-in-the-u-s- [https://perma.cc/EXL9-FQC2].
208. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
209. See Luban, supra note 164, at 66–67; Mogill, supra note 134, at 30–31;
see also Rhode, supra note 6, at 54 (noting law professors’ “sanctimonious”
resistance and insistence that “[e]verything [they] do is pro bono”).
210. Atkinson, supra note 134, at 161; see also Luban, supra note 164, at 66.
211. Storrow & Turner, supra note 197, at 499.
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pro bono that it is difficult to discern what, if anything, is expected.212
Moreover, given the legal profession’s lack of experience with mandatory
pro bono generally, adoption of a nationwide requirement for faculty
would be premature at best—there is simply too little information
regarding what an effective and fair program would entail.
Entirely feasible and appropriate, however, would be a school-byschool approach, with the faculty at individual law schools voting to
impose pro bono requirements on themselves.213 Many schools support
faculty pro bono by various means, including the consideration of pro
bono work in salary raise determinations.214 A few law schools require
“public service” by faculty, which may be fulfilled by the type of work
that non-attorneys equally are able to perform.215 As a general matter,
however, law schools have not taken the further step of requiring faculty
to engage in legal pro bono work.216
212. See AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 193, at 28 (identifying “[s]ervice to the
public, including participation in pro bono activities” as a “core” responsibility to
be fulfilled by the full-time faculty “as a collective body” in Standard 404(a)(6));
Bylaws, ASS’N OF AM. LAW SCHOOLS, http://www.aals.org/about/handbook/by
laws/ (last updated Jan. 2016) (stating in Section 6-1(b)(1) that “the Association
values and expects its member schools to value . . . a faculty . . . devoted to
fostering justice and public service . . . .”) [https://perma.cc/ZB52-K5XW];
Statement of Good Practices by Law Professors in the Discharge of their Ethical
and Professional Responsibilities, in ASS’N OF AM. LAW SCHOOLS, 2016
HANDBOOK 119, 125 (2016) (stating that law professors share the profession’s
“traditional obligation[]” to “engage in uncompensated public service or pro bono
legal activities”).
213. Cf. Emily Zimmerman, Should Law Professors Have a Continuing
Practice Experience (CPE) Requirement?, 6 NE. U. L.J. 131, 164–65 (2013)
(arguing that the most realistic option for instituting a law faculty “continuing
practice experience” requirement would be to leave the decision up to individual
law schools).
214. An ABA webpage listing faculty pro bono programs at many law schools
provides a good sense of these incentives. See Law School Pro Bono Programs:
Faculty and Administrative Pro Bono, AM. BAR ASS’N, https://www.americanbar
.org/groups/probono_public_service/resources/directory_of_law_school_public_
interest_pro_bono_programs/definitions/pb_faculty.html (last updated Aug. 23,
2016) [https://perma.cc/778U-E97S].
215. See id.; see also Communications with law faculty at Lincoln Memorial
University and Stetson University (Dec. 2016 & Jan. 2017) (notes on file with
author).
216. The ABA webpage listing faculty pro bono programs identifies two
schools as requiring faculty pro bono, but efforts to confirm this information were
unsuccessful. See notes on file with author. Although this page was updated in
August 2016, the information is not fully up to date—it does not, for example,
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Western New England University School of Law (“WNE”) is an
exception. When WNE adopted a student pro bono requirement in 2012,
it adopted a similar requirement for faculty, amounting to 20 hours of legal
pro bono work per professor per year.217 WNE has yet to assess formally
the impact of its faculty requirement, but anecdotal reports suggest that
WNE professors—having voted the requirement on themselves—accept it
as part of the norm of their academic life, and many exceed the 20-hour
requirement.218
Other law schools should follow suit. The benefits of individual school
adoption would be substantial for the additional clients who would obtain
needed legal representation. In the bigger picture, adding test case schools
to the mandatory pro bono roster would increase the profession’s
understanding of such programs’ potential to make a more significant dent
in the justice gap—both by better inculcating the “pro bono habit” in
students and by adding more attorneys to the pro bono rolls.219 Researchers
likely would gain a variety of models to study because schools would
adopt programs best suited to their individual needs.
Benefits also would inure to participating schools. Student pro bono
programs no longer would suffer the inconsistency of faculty
disengagement, and classroom impacts could be significant as well. Law
schools train students who overwhelmingly attend with the goal of
becoming practicing attorneys, but most of their teachers have little
exposure to practice.220 Even those who practiced law before academia
become ever further removed from the practicing world. A pro bono
requirement would help bridge that gap, enriching professors’ classrooms
and scholarship with a greater understanding of the territory into which
they send their students.221

include Western New England’s mandatory program. See Law School Pro Bono
Programs: Faculty and Administrative Pro Bono, supra note 214.
217. Cultivating a Service Ethos: The Pro Bono Requirement, PERSPECTIVES:
W. NEW ENGLAND UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, Spring 2013, at 7. By requiring “lawrelated” work for both students and faculty, WNE excludes charitable community
service projects such as building homes and delivering food. See Frequently Asked
Questions, W. NEW ENGLAND UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, http://www1.wne.edu/law
/registrar/pro-bono-Frequestly%20Asked%20Questions.cfm (last visited Sept. 30,
2017) [https://perma.cc/CD8P-K2GS].
218. Communications with WNE law faculty (December 2016) (notes on file
with author).
219. See Mogill, supra note 134, at 29.
220. See, e.g., Zimmerman, supra note 213, at 137–38.
221. See Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 1240; Mogill, supra note 134, at 31–32;
cf. Zimmerman, supra note 213, at 160–62, 176–77 (arguing that law professors
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Communications teams at participating schools could ensure positive
press attention. The headlines suggest themselves: benefit to clients and
community, benefit to students, and benefit to the institution as one of the
few law schools where professors truly “walk the walk.” The payoff in
newsworthiness certainly would be welcome in a time of shrinking
enrollments and fierce competition for tuition dollars and alumni
contributions.222
The profession should undertake incentives to encourage mandatory pro
bono initiatives for faculty. In particular, a mandatory CLE exemption for
faculty at participating schools is a feasible option worth pursuing.
California already exempts full-time law faculty from mandatory CLE
requirements.223 In determining that the California faculty exemption was
not unconstitutional on equal protection grounds, the California Supreme
Court observed that faculty representing clients were more likely than
other attorneys to practice within their fields of expertise and also more
likely to stay abreast of current developments in all areas of the law. 224
This reasoning from California provides a solid argument for law faculty
elsewhere, particularly as part of a mandatory pro bono package.
Such an exemption from state-mandated CLE requirements would be
a modest and logical extension of the movement toward granting
mandatory CLE credit for pro bono hours.225 The exemption proposal
could be bolstered with a provision detailing the obligation of faculty at
participating schools to undertake any instruction necessary for successful
pro bono representation. Thus, any continuing education required under
this scheme actually would serve the competence purpose in stark contrast
to current mandatory CLE requirements.226
should have a “continuing practice experience” requirement for these reasons,
though the requirement need not be fulfilled only through pro bono projects).
222. Many observers have documented law schools’ declining fortunes. See,
e.g., Victor Marrero, Essay, The Cost of Rules, The Rule of Costs, 37 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1599, 1620 (2016); Donald J. Polden, Leading Institutional Change: Law
Schools and Legal Education in a Time of Crisis, 83 TENN. L. REV. 949, 950–51
(2016).
223. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6070(c) (West 2017). Following the ABA
MODEL RULE FOR MINIMUM CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note 15, at §
3(B)(4), the mandatory CLE rules in North Carolina and Tennessee exempt fulltime law professors so long as they do not engage in the practice of law, thus
creating a perverse incentive for law faculty not to engage in pro bono work. See
27 N.C.A.C. ch. 1D, § .1517(e); TENN. SUP. CT. R. 21 § 2.04(e).
224. See Warden v. State Bar of Cal., 982 P.2d 154, 166 (Cal. 1999).
225. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
226. Some pro bono organizations already offer CLE programs to volunteers.
Harris, supra note 7, at 364; see also Megan Cooley, Shauna Wright & Philip
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Acknowledging the potential need for training also would address a
primary practical concern—law faculty are among the least qualified
attorneys to handle pro bono matters given their removal from actual
practice. As with any other unfamiliar professional endeavor, however, a
pro bono attorney must take whatever steps as are necessary to render
competent representation, and no reason supports the contention that law
professors would be derelict in that duty.227 Moreover, the substantive
competency necessary for effective representation might be less daunting
than some faculty fear. The positive impact of attorney representation in
many civil matters flows less from the attorney’s deep understanding of
the relevant law than from the attorney’s ability to navigate simple
procedures and courthouse relationships.228
The qualifying pro bono work for faculty would not have to involve
courtroom representation of individual clients. Because faculty would
impose the requirement on themselves, they could determine the
parameters of the program, including what qualifies as pro bono work. For
example, the legal needs of indigent persons span an enormous range of
subject areas, including tax, civil rights, bankruptcy, domestic relations,
and estate planning—areas with which many faculty have substantial
expertise that could be useful to organizations providing direct representation
or that advocate for broader change.229

Vickers, For the Good of Your City: How Law Firm Pro Bono Can Impact Clients
and the Community, 79 TEX. B.J. 364, 365 (2016) (describing Tarrant County
Volunteer Attorney Services program providing free CLE hours to volunteers
who are then assigned uncomplicated family law cases); Phong Wong, MCLE
Opportunities Through Nonprofit Legal Services Organizations, L.A. LAW., Mar.
2016, at 10 (describing free CLE courses provided by California legal services
offices “in an effort to increase pro bono participation”).
227. See Luban, supra note 164, at 72. Indeed, the academic calendar and
access to sabbatical and other leaves may provide more training opportunities than
exist for other attorneys.
228. See Sandefur, supra note 129, at 911, 926–27. Sandefur’s conclusion
from this data is that although universal attorney representation is impractical,
alternatives should be developed that give clients and non-attorney assistants the
tools necessary for similarly improved outcomes. See id.
229. See Luban, supra note 164, at 72–73 (describing the wide variety of pro
bono matters in which law faculty could become involved). On the other hand,
schools should be mindful of not defining qualifying “pro bono” work so broadly
that individuals unable to afford legal representation are poorly served by the
increased hours. Cf. Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 1244 (arguing that faculty pro
bono “must be for causes or clients that otherwise would not have legal
representation”).
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Another practical objection may be that some professors are not
admitted to the state bar where the school is situated or, indeed, any bar at
all. The easiest scenario for adoption would be at a school where all faculty
are admitted to the local bar.230 Professors admitted elsewhere, however,
still may be able to represent clients locally through reciprocal admission
agreements or court-approved admission for a particular matter.231
Additionally, some jurisdictions make exceptions to unauthorized practice
restrictions for certain types of pro bono representation.232 Faculty who are
not members of any bar might provide research or other assistance to legal
services organizations in a manner that would not violate unauthorized
practice restrictions. At a minimum, faculty should provide the same lawrelated assistance required or encouraged of their students, who, of course,
also are not admitted to the bar.233
Designing a program with an appropriate degree of flexibility would
require faculties to consider a host of questions:
(1) Should particular pro bono experiences be encouraged, and should
such experiences occur in the law school’s own clinics?234 A related issue
concerns the extent to which clinical faculty are expected to provide
training and oversight. For non-clinical faculty, the convenience and
comfort of training by trusted colleagues may be attractive. From the
perspective of clinical faculty, however, the added burden may interfere
substantially with other responsibilities.235
230. See, e.g., Elon Law Faculty: Committed to Teaching, Scholarship &
Service, ELON LAW, https://www.elon.edu/e/law/faculty/index.html (last visited
Sept. 30, 2017) (“All Elon Law professors are members of the North Carolina Bar
Association.”) [https://perma.cc/B76U-JHDR].
231. See, e.g., Pamela A. McManus, Have Law License; Will Travel, 15 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 527, 533–34 (2002).
232. The District of Columbia, for example, permits inactive D.C. bar
members to provide pro bono representation through affiliation with legal services
providers, D.C. CT. APP. R. 49(c)(9)(b), and allows non-members to provide
representation in connection with specifically authorized court programs, R.
49(c)(10).
233. See RHODE, supra note 33, at 461 (proposing various law school reforms,
including “pro bono contributions by faculty at levels comparable to those
expected of students”).
234. See generally Laura Rovner, Unforeseen Ethical Ramifications of Classroom
Faculty Participation in Law School Clinics, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1113 (2007)
(analyzing pros and cons of non-clinical faculty participation in law school clinics).
235. Moreover, clinical professors tend to be of lower status than their “podium”
colleagues. See, e.g., Todd A. Berger, Three Generations and Two Tiers: How
Participation in Law School Clinics and the Demand for “Practice-Ready”
Graduates Will Impact the Faculty Status of Clinical Law Professors, 43 WASH. U.
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(2) Should the obligation fall on each professor individually or could
the faculty fulfill the obligation collectively? If the objective primarily is
to provide more hours of service, collective fulfillment might be attractive.
Such an arrangement, however, would forego full-faculty pro bono
modeling for students, and, again, the temptation may be to foist the
obligation disproportionately on clinical faculty.
(3) Should the school provide concrete institutional support for faculty
pro bono efforts? Such support might include administrative assistance, pro
bono leaves of absence, and stipends to support and reward particularly
intensive pro bono work.236 A school’s willingness to provide such support
would need to be balanced against the school’s need for adequate teaching
coverage and funds for faculty scholarship.
(4) Should the school require the ABA’s recommended 50 annual hours
or a different number, and over what time span?237 One way to avoid the
inevitable conflicts that will arise for some professors in any given year is
to require the desired number of hours over the course of three years rather
than requiring one-third of that amount in each year. Such an arrangement
also would have the potential advantage of encouraging a deeper commitment
to a single matter rather than superficial assistance in several. Another option
for greater flexibility would be to permit a financial contribution to a legal
services program in lieu of personal work, at least on an occasional basis.
The list of program design questions continues. Could the malpractice
policy that covers a school’s clinic participants be expanded to cover other
faculty? How would faculty compliance be monitored and enforced?
Would service exceeding the expected minimum be a part of salary
considerations? Law schools should not be daunted by the long list of open
questions; rather, they should embrace the uncertainty as an opportunity
for innovation, study, and service.

J.L. & POL’Y 129, 135–36 (2013). This imbalance may make it difficult for a clinician
to refuse or even to voice her concerns regarding additional responsibilities stemming
from a faculty pro bono requirement.
236. By way of example, Georgetown University Law Center provides summer
pro bono grants that are equal in amount to summer scholarship grants. Grants are
available to support a “substantial” public service project, “particularly where it
furthers a faculty member’s teaching and scholarship.” GEO. UNIV. LAW CTR.,
FACULTY PRO BONO PROPOSAL (Nov. 1, 2000, rev. March 2003) (on file with author).
237. Both Dean Chemerinsky and Professor Luban proposed 50 hours per year
as reasonable for law faculty. See Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 1244; Luban,
supra note 164, at 60.
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CONCLUSION
Almost a half century of experience and debate demonstrates that the
status quo has not served its purposes. Mandatory CLE does not impact
attorney competence, and voluntary pro bono has made an insufficient dent
in the need for free legal services. The profession has responded with little
more than tinkering around the edges—tweaking mandatory CLE courses
here and there and exhorting attorneys to voluntarily contribute more pro
bono hours.
The lack of data connecting mandatory CLE with improved competence
justifies eliminating the requirement. Mandatory CLE earns hundreds of
millions of dollars in tuition revenues for course purveyors but provides no
discernible public benefit. Although many attorneys undoubtedly gain some
measure of improved competence from particular CLE courses, no evidence
supports the efficacy of a broad requirement.
The substantial need for increased free legal representation cannot be
disputed, and the bar has long recognized attorneys’ general responsibility for
providing pro bono hours. Imposing a pro bono requirement, however, is both
impracticable and unjustified at this time. The legal profession evinces no
willingness to impose or accept a mandatory pro bono system. Moreover, the
profession’s lack of experience with mandatory pro bono programs leaves
researchers with little data to determine whether and how mandatory pro bono
might help close the vast justice gap.
Under these circumstances, a test case approach to mandatory pro bono
is warranted with law faculty as its focus. Law professors benefit substantially
from law practice restrictions that exacerbate the justice gap. Law professors
also produce the future attorneys who hopefully will expand the profession’s
pro bono commitment. Law professors themselves, however, are poor pro
bono contributors. The negative ramifications of this imbalance affect
students, law schools, clients, and the profession. On a school-by-school
basis, law professors should pick up the gauntlet thrown down by Dean
Chemerinsky in 2004238 and impose mandatory pro bono on themselves.

238. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.

